THE COLOR OF SELF-INTEREST

Authors

  • Alina F. Klein Klein
  • Rudolf F. Klein

Keywords:

student engagement, classroom experiments, individual gains, collective gains, game

Abstract

Engaging undergraduate students in economics courses relies increasingly more on using classroom games or experiments. In this paper we propose a linear form of a popular game-theoretic simulation, and then we suggest multiple applications in a variety of contexts. Playing our game in the classroom, students can see for themselves whether their individual choices, guided by self-interest, tend to lead to nearly optimal group outcomes. With little to no change in the setup of our experiment, we show how any instructor can extend the analysis to exemplify inefficient pure-strategy Nash equilibria, the equality/efficiency trade-off and the issue of who “deserves” more, government redistribution versus private charity to the poor, the free-rider problem, and the tragedy of the commons.

Author Biography

  • Rudolf F. Klein

    Engaging undergraduate students in economics courses relies increasingly more on using classroom games or experiments. In this paper we propose a linear form of a popular game-theoretic simulation, and then we suggest multiple applications in a variety of contexts. Playing our game in the classroom, students can see for themselves whether their individual choices, guided by self-interest, tend to lead to nearly optimal group outcomes. With little to no change in the setup of our experiment, we show how any instructor can extend the analysis to exemplify inefficient pure-strategy Nash equilibria, the equality/efficiency trade-off and the issue of who “deserves” more, government redistribution versus private charity to the poor, the free-rider problem, and the tragedy of the commons.

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Published

2024-03-18

Issue

Vol. 24 No. 1 (2024): Journal for Economic Educators

Section

Articles

License

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