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THE GOALS OF THE

TENNESSEE SPEECH COMMUNICATION ASSOCIATION

Stanley K. McDaniel

Nothing imparts health, growth, and vigor to human
enterprises as does the formulating and appropriating of
authentic goals. Our interests and efforts become dynamic
processes when we relentlessly pursue prized, but unattain-
ed goals. This principle applies both to individuals, such
as teachers of communication skills, and to groups, such as
the Tennessee Speech Communication Association. A consider-
ation of goals for TSCA, therefore, should interest the readers
of this journal. As TSCA president-elect, I suggest that all
of us work to formulate and to realize goals that will con-
tinuously revitalize our teaching and profession.

The TSCA officers are currently planning our annual con-
ference. When finalized, we want a program that will help us
serve one another as we serve our students and our communities.
We have adopted as planning guidelines some goals that many of
you expressed during our 1979 conference. Let me share with
you those goals, as TSCA president elect, I affirm, and that
many of you hold to be authentic goals for outselves.

First, we want to achieve an increase of members in TSCA.
The greater our numbers within Tennessee and the wider the
representation from all levels of teaching, from all types of
schools, and from the diverse communication vocations, the

of schools, and from the diverse communication vocations, the greater will be the benefits we will receive from TSCA. We want TSCA to respond to the interests and to provide for the needs of people engaged in teaching and/or practicing the communication arts. The teacher needing help with the noncommunicative, withdrawn first grader, the political campaigner struggling with ethical decisions concerning persuasive methods and messages, the department head fighting for diminishing appropriations, the teacher assigned the impossible teaching load must find support and answers within TSCA. But, this supportive role can only exist as TSCA continues to increase in number and breadth of membership.

As a step toward achieving this goal, we urge all TSCA members to ask your city and county school administrators to approve attendance at our fall conference for continuing education units. We ask that you also urge teachers to seek CEU credit for attending the TSCA conference. Many school districts require that their faculty members continually earn CEU credits. If our conference serves as a recognized inservice educational program, and if it speaks to our professional needs and interests, then we believe TSCA will increase in membership and participation.

Second we want to increase the quality of professionalism among all teachers and practitioners of the communication arts. We see a need to raise our consciousness

as an association of professional people, bound together
by common purposes, problems, and expertise. As pro-
fessionals, the practices of self-direction, self-
evaluation, and self-discipline must characterize us. We
cannot provide professional leadership, influence public
decision-making, or receive the respect and admiration of
other professions if we exist as the hand maiden or step-
child of other professional groups or of the state board
of education.

We have selected, therefore, as the theme for our
coming annual conference, "The Professional Future of
Speech Communication Education in Tennessee--Its Minimum
Objectives and Their Measurement." The program will
include a resource person who has expertise in establish-
ing measurable objectives. Members of our diverse interest
groups will have opportunity to discuss and to begin work
toward an improved professionalism in relation to our
theme. While we recognize that one conference cannot
resolve all the problems we face, even on this one theme,
we also recognize that our conference experience can be one
giant step toward a strengthened and an improved pro-
fessionalism for TSCA.

Third, we want to reaffirm, and perhaps in some
instances to revitalize those educational goals that have
made our discipline and profession historically significant.
In those "golden eras" of intellectual ferment and cultural

progress that occurred in western civilization, the "rhetors" have exerted an important, if not a dominant influence. Classical Greece and Rome and the European Renaissance illustrate the place of rhetoric within intellectual movements. At the risk of oversimplification, I argue that the value of the rhetorical arts, past and present, lies in the educational goals of rhetoric. Stated in the simplest terms, those goals are to produce citizens who have wise things to speak, who have eloquence for speaking, and who have an ethic to enlighten their choices of the means and ends of speaking.

The crises and challenges of the present decade rudely intrude into our lives, and from them we have no escape. The quality of our living, the value of our money, the fuel to travel and to heat our homes is no longer a matter of our choice alone. Our world is frighteningly hostile, increasingly crowded, and dangerously irrational. Given this world, the educational goals of TSCA must create prepared world citizens. By prepared, I mean citizens in whose person rhetoric fulfills its historical function. Prepared citizens speaks wisdom in the midst of foolishness, banality, and irrationality. Prepared citizens speak eloquently in contrast to popular mediocrity, insipidity, and insanity. Prepared citizens inform their own choices by humanly beneficial ethics in a time of political opportunism, public

gullibility, and pervasive permissiveness. Toward the realization of these goals TSCA must address itself in its annual conference and in its daily contributions to the teachers and practitioners of speech communication.

As I count the objectives that TSCA should establish for the immediate year as well as this decade, they are at least three. TSCA must increase its membership in number and breadth of representation. TSCA must raise the professional consciousness and status of its members. TSCA must prepare citizens to function in a crisis world by speaking wisely, eloquently, and humanely. I urge all TSCA members to commit themselves to these goals.

-VIEWPOINT-

Once upon a time, in the land of Mythia, students attending The University received a high quality education. They enjoyed a close relationshop with their faculty and administration. The emphasis was placed upon helping the students learn not just facts--but a way of living--and the necessary tools to adapt themselves to their society. The faculty were available to students for counsel, encourage- ment, and just plain conversation. The administrators of The University were also in close touch with both students and faculty; they knew their faculty closely and were con- cerned about their problems. A member of the faculty knew he could sit down and talk over his problems with them, and they would actually consider what he had to say.

The University was concerned with upgrading its standards, and so it sought to encourage its faculty to pursue further studies. Incentivies were given to complete graduate work, and earn the Magical Degree. Although the primary emphasis was upon teaching, incentives and recognition were also given to the instructor who performed well in research and public service.

The administrators were concerned about keeping up the high degree of morale the faculty enjoyed. Capable leaders were placed over the various departments; these leaders were able to instill into their faculties a sence of accomplish- ment, direction, and fulfillment. The various departments

enjoyed feelings of unity and harmony as they worked together towards their common goals. If a person was selected as a leader who could not lead, he was replaced with one who could. Mythia wanted leaders who believed in faculty; who sought not to motivate faculty through external control and threats of punishment, but who believed that work is as natural as play and rest; who believed that faculty would exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which they were committed; who believed that the average person learns under proper conditions not only to accept but to seek responsibility; who believed that the capacity to help solve problems is widely distributed in the population and that decision making should be based upon messages from all levels of the organization.[1]

But then one day something happened. The land of Mythia decided it was not getting its money's worth out of The University. So they created controlling boards to control The University, and controlling boards to control the controlling boards. They invented numerous forms, which faculty and administrators spent weeks completing, and which were filed away in obscure corners of the controlling boards' offices. Yes, even the record held by the Internal Revenue Service for most forms generated seemed to be in danger.

The land of Mythia could continue to spend enormous amounts of money on non-essential items, but it decreed that

teachers were getting too much. Someone, somewhere, (or
so it is rumored--all records are not clear) discovered a
textbook which he had used thirty years before when he was
attending school, and on the basis of his revelation he was
able to devise 4,762 productivity charts designed to weed
out the "waste" in education. From henceforth, classes
must be larger, and each faculty member must teach more
classes while some faculty must be terminated. Instructors
holding the Magical Degree (which was no longer magical)
must be replaced when possible with instructors who possessed
no magic.

So the faculty had less time for the students; the
students were no longer encouraged to really learn, but to
digest facts, assertions, and other bland statements to
"parrot" them back, and be awarded a diploma. Administrators
no longer were in close touch with the faculty, but spent
their time trying to hold the line against the "economic
crunch." Committees were invented to keep dissident faculty
busy; these committees had no authority of course; they were
"advisory." The committee on determining the authority of
an advisory committee was disbanded after many long hours
of work, because they could not determine what their
authority was. Leadership no longer became a criterion for
holding an administrative position over a department; the
more important standard was to maintain the official party
line. Faculty members who questioned the qualifications of

such people were either replaced or ignored. To enhance the
insecurity of faculty members not holding tenure, a super-
structure was invented composed of sixty-four roadblocks,
any one of which could prevent a person's achieving tenure.
To pass one of these roadblocks was not an accomplishment;
to fail to pass one was disaster.

Since revenue was based upon students enrolled in a
university, administrators threatened departments that unless
they increased enrollment to meet The Formula (which was
changed periodically so no one would ever really under-
stand it), they would lose faculty members and even major
programs. (The amazing development was that these economic
conditions had little or no effect upon the number of
administrators--this number continued to grow.) Since the
departments had these ultimatums, "grade inflation" became
an everyday event. Amazingly, students who had earned "C's"
in the past became"B"students. (Perhaps this is an over-
statement; perhaps actually the instructors became better
teachers, as it was discovered that instructors who started
giving higher grades also began to be evaluated considerably
higher by the students on the students' evaluations of in-
structors.)

And so the land of Mythia produced students with higher
academic averages than ever, but who amazingly did not per-
form as well on the job. The managers failed to manage, the

managed failed to produce, and someone began to complain that for some reason the quality of education had declined and that it was all the fault of those over-indulged teachers. And then one day Mythia died.

Perhaps Mythia is not so far off; this may be exactly what we see in our educational system today. We may casually say that there is really nothing that can be done, but perhaps this is because educators have traditionally been too content with simply taking what is given them. We have compromised with basic academic philosophy.

Jacques Barzun, in his Teacher in America, writes:

> Consequently, the whole aim of teaching is to turn the young learner, by nature a little copycat, into an independent, self-propelling creature, who cannot merely learn but study--that is, work as his own boss to the limit of his powers. This is to turn pupils into students, and it can be done on any rung of the ladder of learning.[2]

This writer subscribes wholeheartedly to this point of view. A good sound education must be centered around helping the person help himself; it must also teach the student not to be content with less than his full potential. We live in an age where too many people are satisfied with mediocrity-- the "gentleman's C" (or as grade inflation has often changed the expression, the "gentleman's B"). The educator must disturb the student so he will not be satisfied with the mediocre.

We must demand more of our political leaders. Will we continue to be content with living under an inflation rate in excess of 12% only to be told that the average raise for state employees will be 6%? Will we continue to be content

to be governed by mushrooming bureaucracies that tell us we must follow numerous forms and formulas to prove our abilities? Will we continue to be content to listen to the prophets of gloom who tell us we must cut back on faculties because someday enrollment will experience a severe drop. (The years for these projections are periodically revised; we are already in a time period when we were told that enrollments would be down. But the facts compiled by the National Center for Education Statistics indicate that college enrollment is up 2.4 per cent over last fall. Furthermore, the prophets of gloom fail to consider that the migration southward into the Sunbelt States, of which Tennessee is one, will help the enrollment of all levels of education in this state.)

We must be more concerned with electing and supporting public officials who are truly sympathetic with education's needs, and who will do more than utter glib campaign statements saying that they understand education's needs. We must be more concerned with being actively involved in processes which will change these conditions.

We must demand more of our academic leaders. They should be expected to be leaders first, rather than chart-manufacturers and paper-pushers. The academic leader must be one who is willing and able

    1. To inspire his faculty positively (as opposed to negative motivation via ominous sounds and threats

of possible firings, etc.); he should inspire his
faculty to believe in themselves, to inspire their
students, and to do their best work. Any type of
faculty evaluation should be improvement-centered,
rather than becoming one of sixty-four roadblocks
which can be filed and used as justification for
failing to tenure or promote the instructor.

2. To show himself by example to be a leader. Administra-
tion is no excuse to retire from scholarship into
the books of regulations. He should continue to be
a writer, a leader in professional organizations. If
he has to dictate to his faculty greater teaching loads,
he should be willing to show that he is assuming a
greater load himself. Even if he has a position that
does not require classroom teaching, he should con-
sider returning to the classroom for at least one
course; this would keep him somewhat in touch with
students and the difficulties imposed upon faculties
by large sections, teacher evaluations, and other
signs of the past decade.

3. To be available to his faculty. He should be willing
and able to create an environment where it is possible
to discuss academic and personal concerns without the
faculty member feeling threatened; this environment
should be one in which the parties feel comfortable

as people. Furthermore, the parties should feel that something really tangible can develop as a result of these conversations.

4. To be a spokesperson for those under him. He must be willing, when policies are being discussed, before they are finally promulgated, to not be just a "Yes-man" who is afraid to have confrontations with his superiors. While he has responsibilities in carrying out policies of superiors, he must also remember that he is the major spokesperson--in fact, sometimes the only human spokesperson allowed by the academic superstructure--of his faculty, and he must be re-sponsive to faculty concerns.

How can this be achieved? The answer is not an easy one, but it cannot come about from our withdrawing into our ivory towers and saying that nothing can be done to change anything.

Jesse Stuart once wrote in his book, <u>To Teach, to Love</u>; "Love, a spirit of adventure and excitement, a sense of mission has to get back into the classroom. Without it our schools--and our country--will die." Let's work to get these goals back into teaching.

- David Walker

NOTES

[1] Adapted from Gerald M. Goldhaber, *Organizational Communication*, pp. 78-79.

[2] P. 24.

[3] P. 8.

THE COUNTERPLAN: A THEORETICAL STUDY OF

JUDGING CRITERIA

David Steinberg

In 1977 Walter Ulrich identified an increasing
interest in the use of the counterplan in intercollegi-
ate debate.[1] This trend is somewhat surprising in light
of the virtual absence of any generally accepted counter-
plan theory with the debate community. In 1951 Harold
E. Wisner reviewed what he considered to be the twelve
most important debate texts, hoping to find a consensus
on the effect of the burden of proof on judging counter-
plans. He found six of the texts to be indefinite, and
the remaining six to be split on the question of who has
the greater burden.[2] Attempting to determine whether or
not there was confusion on the same question, Wayne N.
Thompson performed a similar survey in 1962. He reviewed
what he considered to be the six major argumentation texts
and five others he considered less important. Thompson
found none of the texts to be complete or definite.[3]

In 1974 Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer
criticized the traditional concept of presumption as
providing no guidance for judging counterplans. Later they
indicted traditional theory as assigning arbitrary and con-
fusing criteria to stock issues, and as providing no
criteria from which to choose competing policy systems.[4]
Ulrich noted that, prior to 1972, the articles that did

discuss counterplans provided only limited application of theory. Since 1972, only specific issues have been addressed; thus theory has been discussed by debaters largely on an ad hoc basis.[5]

A great deal of debate literature has appeared in the last fifteen years. Little emphasis has been placed on the area of counterplan theory, yet the texts consistently have included some discussion. This paper expands the Wisner and subsequent Thompson studies, providing a review of relevant criteria. Those concepts, evident throughout the available literature, which are important as criteria to judge the counterplan are identified. Although other concepts are discussed, the natural division seems to be into three categories: 1) presumption, 2) burden of proof, and 3) competitiveness. This review focuses on these three areas.

A synthesis of the existing concepts of the counterplan is important in clarifying the responsibilities of a negative team choosing such a strategy. Thompson contended that such a clarification is an important value in itself. He further argued that eliminating confusion will allow better debating; debaters should not argue over procedural technicalities.[6]

Ulrich noted that since not all judges are likely to agree on a single theory of the counterplan, debaters will have to discuss these concepts in debate rounds. In fact, he encouraged this practice, but he argued that the debaters

should have an understanding of the important concepts.
This is true for both affirmative and negative teams,
since theory may also be used to refute the counterplan.[7]

Whether or not a universally accepted theory of the
counterplan can avoid debate over theoretical problems,
and whether that is desirable, is yet to be seen and is
not the subject of this study. Nevertheless, with or
without debate over theory, a basic understanding and
awareness of the underlying concepts is important.
Neither goal can be achieved without a basic knowledge of
the existing thought in the field. This paper examines
the existing thought evident in debate literature.

A THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE COUNTERPLAN

Traditional theorists have consistently warned nega-
tives of the dangers of adopting a counterplan strategy.
It often has been called risky, since the negative assumes
a burden of proof and abandons presumption. The counter-
plan often is called the most radical negative approach.
John Pacilio, Jr. and William H. Stites advised students
to "simply avoid its use."[8] James C. McCrosky warned that
many judges dislike counterplans, and that the inexperienc-
ed judge may not understand the concept.[9] Roy V. Wood felt
that the counterplan admitted the need, and some judges find
that reason enough to vote affirmative. Most judges are

biased against the counterplan, and many consider it a
trick strategy.[10] Although he later seemed to change his
view, in 1944 Wayne N. Thompson did not consider the
counterplan a legitimate strategy. He argued that such a
strategy makes a debate multilateral and damages the
ability to thoroughly test a single solution. The counter-
plan creates confusion, decreases the time available for
each specific policy, and prevents direct clash. Thompson
contended that a negative supporting a counterplan does
not indict the weakness of the original policy.[11]

Despite these criticisms, traditional theorists general-
ly have recognized the counterplan as a legitimate strategy
in unique circumstances. George W. Zieglemueller and Charles
A. Dause suggested that strong counterplans are rare due to
the nature of debate resolutions.[12] Arthur N. Kruger con-
tended that only in unique situations is a presumption for
change warranted; thus, few propositions are chosen that
actually offer the choice of a counterplan.[13] Nevertheless,
a counterplan may be relevant to any policy resolution, when
the status quo is not easily defended. Most of the traditional
theorists agree that a counterplan is legitimate if the nega-
tive is unable to defend the present system. Kruger implied
that the negative may choose a counterplan strategy if both
teams agree on the intended end or goal of the system, but
differ on the most effective means to reach that end.[14]

Traditional Bases

Traditional theory supports the counterplan through real world analogies. The most often cited are the legal analogy and the closely related parliamentary and legislative analogies. A good example of the legal analogy was provided by James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills:

> Suppose in the burglary case..., instead of confining its case to proving unfounded one or more of the five accusations, the defense simply denies them all and offers evidence that proves conclusively that not A, the accused, but X, committed the crime in question.[15]

This situation often is referred to as taking an affirmative defense. Many of the authors, thus, considered the negative supporting a counterplan to be, in essence, an affirmative plan, and should be equally as detailed.[16] A major change in the second edition of George McCoy Musgrave's Competitive Debate was the contention that both affirmative and negative teams offering plans should provide significant description when called upon to do so. Vagueness should be avoided.[17]

Another analogy frequently made to the counterplan is the legislative one. Henry Lee Eubank and J. Jeffery Auer provided an example:

> The negative may admit the existance of a serious problem, but argue that the affirmative is advocating the wrong solution. This position is often taken by the opposition in legislative and political debates. For example, both major parties believe something should be done for the farmer, but each has its own farm programs and each fears the worst should the opposition's plan be adopted.[18]

Musgrave then suggested that a counterplan which would be relevant in a legislative context may be proposed.[19] According to Musgrave the "ideal counterplan" was diffrent in principle from the affirmative plan, and "gives sufficient grounds for rejecting the affirmative proposal." He warned, however, that ideal counterplans were rare, and thus a strict rule allowing only counterplans that would be acceptable in legislative assemblies should be enforced. If the counterplan was very similar to the affirmative plan, it could only be considered if the difference was shown to be so important as to provide a reason to reject the plan in favor of the counterplan. Surprise in legislative situations was acceptable, thus counterplans used for the effect of surprise were acceptable, just as "facetious and irrelevant" counterplans were out of order. Just as in legislative practice, "disputed matter is admitted if there is doubt as to its admissibility."[20]

Another analogy close in concept to the legislative example is the parliamentary example. A motion to substitute is seen as the counterpart to a counterplan. Such a motion attempts to substitute itself for, or amend, the motion originally being debated in parliamentary procedure. Since an equal vote for and against a substitute motion resulted in its defeat, Thompson reasoned that a counterplan found equal in merit to an affirmative plan was defeated.[21] In addition, the new motion must address the

the same questions as the original bill:

> To be germane, an amendment must in some way involve the same question that is raised by the motion to which it is applied.[22]

Based on this rule, it has been reasoned that counterplans should address the same issue or deal with the same problem area as the affirmative plan.[23]

Systems Analysis

A modern innovation in debate theory was the model incorporating General Systems Theory and public policy analysis. This "judging paradigm," known as systems analysis has become extremely popular in the debate community. In a 1973 work, Bernard Brock, James Chesebro, John Cragan, and James Klumpp articulated the concept and its implications for academic debate.[24] It is not the purpose of this paper to explore the model in detail; instead, its implications for counterplan theory are discussed.

Systems analysis viewed academic debate as a type of public policy analysis. It recognized complex interaction of systems and sub-systems, multiple causation, and the constantly changing nature of systems and policy. In systems analysis debate, two consistent policy proposals were compared as to relative merit by the use of cost benefit analysis. It was imperative in systems analysis debate that the negative team, as well as the affirmative defend a coherent system for comparison. This emphasis

gave increased importance to the counterplan as a negative

strategy:

> In addition to eliminating status quo
> revisions as a viable negative position, the
> necessity to compare influences the other three
> positions as well. Direct refutation becomes
> less important, because with this strategy the
> negative does not defend a specific system.
> Defense of the status quo is awkward, unless
> the negative specifies precisely what it means
> by status quo and defends this system. Counter-
> proposal becomes more acceptable, because this
> stand represents a comparison of systems.
>
> Increased emphasis upon comparison will
> force the negative either to defend the present
> policy as a system or recommend a substitute
> system, a counterproposal.[25]

The counterplan, then, was a logical negative system. Brock

et al felt that a counterplan acquired a burden of proof, but

its measurement was unclear. They objected to the ambiguous

position of supporting the status quo and major changes, the

latter assuming a burden of proof. Thus, the counterplan, as

a concrete position, was superior for the purposes of comparison.

Systems analysis viewed the status quo as constantly in

flux. Thus, unlike the traditional perspective which expected

a negative denial of the need for change and considered repairs

and counterplans unusual, systems analysis called for a

negative position developed to cope with change. Traditional

views that "such negative positions are somehow not as 'important'

as the negative denial of a need for change," were altered by

system's concepts:

> As we introduce systemic analysis into
> affirmative debating, this traditional perspec-
> tive changes, and changes rather drastically.
> Instead of viewing the first affirmative speech
> as a complete statement of position, the first
> affirmative speech is viewed as only the first
> assertion for one system of change which will be
> denied by a counterassertion for a different
> system of change. The negative counterassertions
> may vary greatly. Many negative counterassertions
> will clearly assume that drastic changes are
> appropriate (perhaps a counterplan).
>
> Given the assumption that change is ever-
> present, the negative counterassertion must include
> a system for dealing with change as well as insur-
> ing that the negative set of changes preclude the
> significance and responsiveness of the affirmative
> system for change (the debate resolution). From a
> systemic point of view, then, the negative pos-
> ture will include a "new" system. [26]

Counterplans then assumed constant change and countered

the resolution as defined by the affirmative proposal.

Systems analysis, since it focused on issues of public

policy decision-making, emphasized the legislative analogy:

> The public debate over medicare illustrates how
> the legislative process modifies the traditional
> negative stands and forces debaters to defend a
> system. Initially, the negative (led by the
> American Medical Association) responded to the
> King-Anderson Bill, medical care for the aged
> administered through Social Security, by arguing
> that there simply was no need for it--defense of
> the present system. However, as debate progressed
> and they apparently were losing, the AMA was forced
> to support a specific change as a counterproposal,
> the Kerr-Mills-AMA alternative to the King-Anderson
> Bill . . . the point is that in legislative debate
> the important issue is "which alternative is the
> most desirable one?" [27]

The most important implication of the analogy was the re-
quirement of both sides to support a consistent position as
defined by a specific, coherent policy system. As already
seen, this idea encouraged use of the counterplan.

Brock et al. assumed that the negative, in supporting
their policy system, assumed the "same responsibilities as
the affirmative team."[28] They warned negatives that a
strategy of supporting repairs increased the negative burden
of proof to be equal to that of the affirmative.[29] It was
unclear whether this same rule applied to presentation of
a counterplan. The systems view of presumption was the idea
that "he who asserts must prove." Because of inertia (it
takes energy, or effort, to change policies), some presumption
was assigned to present policies. This presumption was passive
and not significant overall.[30] It was unclear just how pre-
sentation of a counterplan affected presumption.

In summary, systems analysis granted increased importance
to the counterplan. Due to its emphasis on policy comparison,
its recognition of constant change, and use of the legis-
lative analogy, systems analysis provided a sound theoretical
basis for the counterplan. Competing policies were measured
relative to each other by use of cost benefit analysis.
Criteria of presumption, burden of proof, and competitiveness
were unclear, although the counterplan, or negative system,
had to preclude the effectiveness of the affirmative system.

Hypothesis-Testing

Another recent innovation in debate theory is the
hypothesis-testing paradigm as advanced by David Zarefsky.
This model viewed academic debate as analogous to the
method of scientific inquiry. The affirmative proposition
was parallel to the researcher's hypothesis in statistical
analysis; it was a yes/no question to be answered as
probably true or probably false. The hypothesis should
be rigorously tested against all possible alternatives.
The counterplan, then, was a null hypothesis to be weighed
against the original question.

In a 1976 paper, Zarefsky discussed six of the im-
plications the hypothesis-testing paradigm had for academic
debate. First, the wording of the proposition was more
important than specific plan wording. The goal of debate
is only to answer a question; nothing was actually adopted.
The plan should only illustrate the principles of the resolu-
tion; a legislative bill was unnecessary. Debate about
specific plan issues was hypothetical in nature. The word-
ing of the resolution was critical, and of importance in
defining alternative hypotheses, or counterplans:

> By contrast, the wording of the proposition is
> of central importance, since the proposition is
> the hypothesis being put to the test. Any different
> statement of a proposition assumes the character of
> an alternate hypothesis.[31]

PUBLICATION INFORMATION

The purpose of the publication is to expand professional interest and activity in all areas of the field of speech communication in Tennessee. Articles from all areas of speech study will be welcomed, with special consideration given to articles treating pedagogical concepts, techniques, and experiments.

All papers should be sent to the editor. Authors should submit two copies of their manuscripts, each under a separate title page also to include the author's name and address. Manuscripts without the identifying title pages will be forwarded by the editor to a panel of reader-referees who will represent the varied interests within the discipline.

All papers should be double-spaced, typed in standard type with a dark ribbon, and on standard typing paper. Margins should be standard and uniform. Notes need to be typed single-spaced on separate sheets following the last page of the manuscript proper. The first footnote should be unnumbered and should contain essential information about the author. This footnote will be eliminated by the editor from the manuscripts sent to the panel of readers. Any professional style guide, consistently used, is acceptable. Accuracy, originality, and proper citing of source materials are the responsibilities of the contributors.

Institutions and individuals wishing to be patrons of the Journal may do so with a contribution of $25.00 yearly.

Thus, to be competitive, the counterplan must be different from the proposition in principle. The main question was whether the affirmative could justify the proposition:

> In order for proposition X to withstand the challenge that alternate hypothesis Y could account equally well for the phenomena being discussed, a specific defense must be made for proposition X--not just for "a change" or even for a direction in which change should proceed. Hence the genre of "justification" arguments is of special significance.[32]

The counterplan, as an alternate hypothesis, attempted to provide an alternate explanation, denying the affirmative justification.

A second implication of hypothesis-testing was the idea that presumption always rested against the resolution, since the hypothesis was assumed false until other reasonable explanations could be rejected. Negatives always retained presumption; thus, distinctions between minor repairs and counterplans were irrelevant. Only by advocating the affirmative hypothesis could the negative lose the advantage of presumption.[33]

The third and fourth implications deal with fiat power and inherency and are of little importance to counterplan theory.

The fifth set of implications discussed deals with the counterplan specifically. Just as plans are not adopted by warrant of affirmative decisions, counterplans are conditional, and would not be adopted. Rejection of the resolution did not require endorsement of the alternative. Counterplans questioned the affirmative justification:

> The function of the counterplan is to argue
> that the specific proposition under consideration
> has not been justified. How can proposition X be
> said to be warranted if alternative proposition
> Y accounts for the data equally well?[34]

Thus, the counterplan was a type of conditional justification agreement. To present a counterplan was not to admit the affirmative problem area, but only to show the failure of the affirmative to provide justification to believe the truth of the resolution. Presumption was retained by the negative proposing a counterplan, since the proposition was presumed false. Legislative specificity was not necessary; the negative must only "claim that action based on principles incompatible with the principles of the proposition would be an equally appropriate way to deal with a given problem."[35]

The final implication made by Zarefsky was concerned with the nature of the judge's decision. The question did not deal with "this -versus-that," but rather was a "yes or no" decision.[36] In summary, hypothesis-testing viewed the counterplan as an alternate hypothesis. It was conditional, challenged the affirmative justification of the proposition, and retained presumption.

Summary

The counterplan, given certain situations, is generally accepted as theoretically sound. Traditional theorists supported the counterplan as analogous to various legal settings, legislative activity, and parliamentary procedure.

The systems analysis paradigm encouraged the counterplan as a competing policy for comparative policy analysis. The hypothesis-testing model view the counterplan as an alternate hypothesis, against which to test the probable truth of the resolution.

THE NATURE OF JUDGING CRITERIA

The counterplan is well supported as a sound negative approach in debate. Yet, there is little consensus on the necessary criteria for judging the counterplan. A greater understanding of the tools used for measurement and evaluation of argumentation is critical to a greater understanding of theory and to more effective practice. The most important concepts, identified by most authors and addressed specifically in this treatment, are presumption, burden of proof, and competitiveness. These terms are defined briefly and then examined in relation to the counterplan. Finally, some other relevant decision rules are discussed.

Presumption

Lichtman and Rohrer indicated that a presumption is a prejudgment made in favor of a given side.[37] The traditional concept of presumption is derived from Archbishop Richard Whately's definition of presumption as a "preoccupation of the ground." This implied not necessarily that an existing institution is good, but that it will stand until some sufficient reason is presented to change or remove that

institution. This concept is drawn from the legal analogy
to presumption of innocence. A person is assumed to be
innocent until sufficient proof is raised against him.[38]
Although this is the predominant view of presumption, others
have been forwarded. Most theorists contended that the
negative supporting a counterplan abandons presumption,
yet this is not universal, and there is no agreement on
what does happen to presumption in the case of a counter-
plan. Two views that are relevant to a discussion of
counterplans are those preceptions of presumption within
the hypothesis-testing model and those advanced by Lichtman
and Rohrer in their "risk" theory. These concepts are
identified later where they are relevant.

Of the texts reviewed, only five specifically mentioned
presumption. All five indicated a loss of the advantage of
presumption by a negative team offering a counterplan. Capp,
Dick, Wood, and Zieglemueller all indicated a negative loss
of presumption. None clarified where presumption then lies,
or if it ceased to exist.[39] O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales
in 1917, explained that a negative offering a counterplan
became an affirmative; thus there were two propositions at
once, and no presumption existed.[40]

Ulrich noted that according to traditional theory in
general, the negative abandoned presumption to the affirmative
when offering a counterplan. This was supported by the parlia-
mentary model. When offering a motion to substitute, a

majority vote was required. Thus a tie meant the sub-
stitute motion failed, and the original motion was weighed
on its merits. By analogy, the counterplan failed in a
tie, so the affirmative had presumption. The legal analogy
also was relevant. When a defendant pleaded guilty but
offered an affirmative defense, presumption usually shifted.
Thus, if a counterplan was analogous to an affirmative
defense, presumption in debate also would shift.[41] Wisner
agreed that the arrirmative gained presumption, but offered
different support. He argued that the affirmative should
have the advantage of presumption when the negative did the
unexpected. This argument is based on practical reasons.
First, when the negative chose to introduce a counterplan,
they had an advantage in preparation; and second, since
first affirmative constructive time was wasted.[42]

Nebergall offered an interesting analysis. He first
criticized the legislative analogy. Legislators, given the
opportunity to vote on two conflicting policies, had other
options. They could attempt to amend either bill, or vote
against both policies and retain the status quo. Since
there was no such choice in debate, the analogy was invalid.
The legal analogy was no more applicable. An accused person
either was guilty or not guilty. His guilt was a question
of fact. This fact could be disproved by proof of a contrary
fact; someone else committed the crime. This did not apply

to a question of policy. Existence of a good policy did
not prove that another policy, even a contradictory one,
was bad. Nebergall suggested that even if the counterplan
was not proven to be superior to the affirmative plan, the
affirmative must overcome presumption to win. Thus, in a
manner, the negative retained presumption.[43]

Lichtman and Rohrer advised that decision rules should
determine presumption based on the unique circumstances of
the matter under consideration. They offered five bases for
determining which policy incurred the greater risk: (1) the
degree of deviation suggested, (2) the value of the policies
disturbed, (3) the status of the present system, (4) the
reversability of the change, and (5) the quality of informa-
tion available. Presumption was assigned to the policy
imposing the least risk based on these criteria.[44]

Hypothesis Testing offered another view of presumption.
According to this theory, the resolution was analogous to a
scientific hypothesis, assumed to be false. Since the
resolution was presumed false until proven otherwise, pre-
sumption always was against the resolution. This theory
implied that the affirmative must offer the best possible
policy. An affirmative vote locked the system to a specific
policy; a negative vote kept all alternatives open. Thus, the
negative supporting anything other than the resolution re-
tained presumption.[45]

When presumption is considered in relation to the
counterplan, it was usually assumed that the negative abandoned

its advantage of presumption upon presentation of a counter-
plan. This was probably based on the traditional concept of
presumption in favor of existing institutions. Recent studies
have shown that the concept of presumption established in
debate literature is similarly reflected in actual practice.[46]

Burden of Proof

Closely related to the concept of presumption is the
burden of proof. According to Whately's theory, the burden
of proof lies with the side attempting to overturn presump-
tion.[47] Lichtman and Rohrer argue that it is harmful to
link presumption and burden of proof. Rather, they would
contend that "he who asserts must prove" is a more accurate
description.[48] The variation in counterplan theory concern-
ing the burden of proof is quite simple and clearly bilateral-
ly divided. One group contends that the negative must prove
their counterplan superior to the affirmative plan; the other
contingent supposes that a counterplan equal in merit to the
affirmative plan warrants rejection of the resolution. This
might seem a minor distinction; the possibility of a situa-
tion where plan and counterplan provide equal merits being
small. Yet, this question is basic to an understanding of
counterplan theory, and an important distinction in judging
criteria. It is central to the purpose of policy comparison.
Are we to choose the best policy, or test the merits of a
single policy?

The traditional theorists agreed, almost universally, that a counterplan carried a greater burden of proof than the affirmative plan. The most common statement was that the negative proposing a counterplan assumed <u>A</u> burden of proof while the affirmative retained <u>THE</u> burden of proof. Zieglemueller clarified by indicating that the negative assumed an equal but distinct burden of proof.[49] The affirmative must meet their burden, and, if they failed. they lost, regardless. The negative, on the other hand, must prove their plan to be superior to the affirmative plan, according to fourteen of seventeen texts addressing the issue.[50] As mentioned earlier, Thompson provided support with the parliamentary analogy. A substitutive motion failed if the vote was tied; thus, the superiority of the counterplan represented the majority vote.[51]

In 1976, Austin J. Freeley revised his text for its fourth edition. Although previous editions had maintained the position that a successful counterplan must be superior to the affirmative plan, in the revised fourth edition, he stated that, if the counterplan was equally as desirable as the affirmative, then the affirmative had failed to meet its burden.[52] McBurney and Mills indicated that the affirmative must prove its plan is the best solution, and thus, a counterplan equal in merit to the affirmative plan would require would require rejection of the resolution.[53] In his later text, Mills defined the burden of proof to be

"logical and ethical responsibility adequate to affirm any assertion which turns out to be controversial." Based on this definition, and assigning the burden to the affirmative first, he suggested that the affirmative must "preponderate" while the negative need only "balance."[54] Hypothesis testing required that the affirmative assume a greater burden, and risk theory assigned the burden based on the nature of the changes proposed. The team with the greater degree of risk, based on the previously mentioned criteria, lost presumption.

Musgrave recognized views contrary to his. Some argued that since a counterplan may be difficult to distinguish from the status quo with repairs, the affirmative always should have the burden to prove its policy superior. Musgrave contended this was absurd, since it was quite easy to distinguish the status quo from a counterplan.[55]

Competitiveness

Finally, the question of competitiveness is important. All agree that a counterplan must compete with the affirmative; that it, in fact, be counter. However, theorists differ on what constitutes competitiveness. Some argue that the advantages or need areas of each respective plan compete. Others feel that preclusion of simultaneous adoption equals competition. Clearly, this question is vital to a clearer understanding of the criteria for judging the counterplan.

Ulrich contended that competitiveness was the most vital but least understood criterion of judging the counterplan. He suggested that traditional theorists required a counterplan to accrue the affirmative advantage, or solve its need area, in order to be competitive. This concept probably is derived from the parliamentary analogy. To amend a motion by substitution, the second bill must deal with the same problem area the original bill did. Thus, even a superior counterplan, according to this theory, would be rejected if it did not meet the affirmative's need.[56] This contention is backed up by a review of the literature. Of twenty-three texts that spoke to the subject, twenty-one required the counterplan to meet the affirmative need. Three of five journal articles making advocative statements indicated the need of the counterplan to solve the affirmative problem area.[57]

Of the texts requiring solvency of the affirmative need, Bauer, Terry, and Thompson allowed the negative to develop a new need area in addition to the affirmative one. Bauer warned, however, that this practice may result in the uncertain contrast of irrelevant policies and problems. Freeley and Pacilio suggested that instead of meeting the affirmative's need as stated, the negative could redefine the problem, then provide a new proposal. Several authors noted the negative's option to differ on the causes of the stated need. Bauer and Wood allowed a re-analysis, but

required accrual of the specific affirmative advantage.
Finally, Terry suggested that the negative should solve
the problem area cited by the affirmative team, but that
they could offer conflicting values within the same pro-
blem area.[58]

Lichtman and Rohrer criticized this traditional point
of view. They contended that while decision theory implied
competitiveness, traditional theory only required another
means to solve the same problem area. Thus, they argued
that while two plans could work together effectively,
traditional theory would not allow adoption of both.[59]
Ulrich contended that the emphasis has shifted from com-
petitiveness of the need area to the nature of the plans.[60]
This assertion seemed somewhat questionable, since thirteen
of the texts reviewed, including one published in 1917,
required plan incompatibility. Four of the five journal
articles also required plan competitiveness. Of the texts,
six provided the test of mutual exclusivity to determine
competitiveness. If simultaneous adoption of the counter-
plan and the plan was possible, then the counterplan was to
be rejected, or rather, simply incorporated into the
affirmative proposal. Ziegelmueller suggested that the
counterplan must be structurally and philosophically
inconsistent with the affirmative plan. Colburn indicated
that the counterplan should be "outside the intent" of

the affirmative plan. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills used the term "inconsistent," and contended that the counterplan must clash with the plan on "some vital issue."[61]

The remaining writers indicated that the counterplan should be different in principle from the affirmative plan. Musgrave predicted that without an understanding of the purpose of such a rule, there would be much debate over what constituted a "change of principle." The purpose he defined was to avoid negatives adopting a counterplan that was too similar to the affirmative plan.[62] One theorist advocated a concept of competitiveness based on structural, functional, or philosophical deviations.[63] As explained earlier, the parliamentary analogy was used to justify a requirement of solving a common need area.

Lichtman and Rohrer advocated a rule based on two criteria for competitiveness. A counterplan was competitive if (1) plan and counterplan were mutually exclusive, or (2) adoption of both the counterplan and the plan was less desirable than adoption of the counterplane alone.[64] This concept was criticized as repugnant. If negatives were allowed to claim advantages in any problem area, debate would be only a confusion of issues, and clash will be avoided in absence of a common goal.[65] Lichtman and Rohrer responded to these criticisms by arguing that their counterplan theory was less confused than traditional theory, that clash was defined by the relevant theory, and that the focus should be on policy comparison.[66]

Other Concepts

A few other concepts require comment. Most of the
writers have implied that a counterplan should be non-
topical. Only Ulrich provides any analysis. He suggests
a problem concerning a standard of topicality of a
counterplan, and cites three views. The standard of
topicality for an affirmative plan is generally reason-
ableness. Some theorists have contended that a counterplan
may be reasonably nontopical. Others argue that if an
affirmative can prove the counterplan topical by any defini-
tion, it is topical; and finally, some require the counterplan
to fall outside of the affirmative definitions.

Counterplans sometimes are said to be conditional or
hypothetical. This strategy includes a defense of the status
quo, and suggests that if the status quo fails, the counter-
plan can solve the needs. Hypothetical counterplans usually
adopt less than the resolution to gain the affirmative advan-
tage, and thus pose a question of affirmative justification.[67]
A recent study of judges at the National Debate Tournament
revealed that only 15.8% of judges generally accepted the
conditional strategy. The remaining 84.2% of the judges were
split evenly between accepting the conditional strategy with
reservations and generally rejecting it. One judge commented,
"A counterplan is like death--quite a commitment. You cannot
be a little dead, a little pregnant, or a conditional counter-
plan."[68]   Other authors allow a negative to minimize the
affirmative's need and at the same time support a counterplan.[69]

Summary

A general lack of focus pervades the consideration of
counterplan judging criteria. After a review, it can be
stated that presumption is relatively unimportant as a
decision tool for counterplan evaluation. Most traditional
theorists seem to support a vague concept of negative
abandonment of presumption. This is consistent with Richard
Whately's conception of a presumption in favor of the status
quo or existing institutions. Since the negative, by virtue
of presenting a counterplan, is generally thought to be admit-
ting the need for change, they reject the status quo and its
presumptive advantage. While systems analysis does not view
presumption as particularly important, decision rules
established by risk theory assign presumption based on degree
of risk as dictated by the unique circumstances of a given
debate. Hypothesis testing views presumption is lying
against the resolution; thus a negative would have to support
a propositional alternative in order to lose the advantage
of presumption.

With or without theoretical backing, most theorists
reviewed considered the negative supporting a counterplan
to assume a burden to prove their proposal superior in merit
to the affirmative plan. An articulate minority believed
that the counterplan must be only equal to the affirmative
plan to prevail, since the affirmative's burden required the
affirmative plan to be proven superior to all options.

The most important and least clear of the criteria reviewed was competitiveness. A commonly accepted and logical rule for competitiveness was mutual exclusivity. If the affirmative could support adoption of the counterplan, and not endanger their own justification, the negative lost. More elusive was the concept that the counterplan must solve the same need as the affirmative plan. This became even more confusing when many theorists allowed the negative latitude in redefining the need area. Some writers addressed both standards of competitiveness, but did not make clear whether both were required. Finally, the counterplan must be different, by some standard, from the resolution. In some cases a counterplan may be argued hypothetically or conditionally.

CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed published counterplan theory as advanced by scholars interested in academic debate. The theoretical basis for the counterplan within traditional theory, systems analysis and hypothesis-testing has been examined and reviewed. The nature of judging criteria was identified. A description of the important concepts preceded a discussion of those concepts as criteria within counterplan theory. A brief analysis of some other relevant criteria was included.

The literature revealed more agreement than might be expected, yet no consistent theory of the counterplan can be identified. Future study should focus on the implications of the important concepts in actual practice, and on a synthesis of those concepts into a consistent theory. In addition, the effects of the differing decision models on counterplan criteria deserves more attention. Inevitably theory must be determined in debate rounds. It is hoped that a greater awareness of theory of counterplan judging criteria will help to give meaning to that practice.

NOTES

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[26] Brock et al., pp. 87-88.

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[30] Brock et al., pp. 153-54.

[31] David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis-Testing," unpublished paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, San Francisco, California, December 28, 1976, p. 7.

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[44]Lichtman and Rohrer, Burden of Proof, pp. 40-41; Ulrich, p. 9. The idea that presumption should be measured based on the peculiar situation was first advanced in James M. O'Neill and James H. McBurney, The Working Principles of Argument (New York: Macmillian, 1932), p. 39.

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[46]Thomas J. Hynes, Jr., "The Counterplan: An Historical and Descriptive Study," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1972; David L. Steinberg, "The Counterplan: Theoretical and Pragmatic Reality," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1979, pp. 75-78.

[47]Whately, pp. 26-29.

[48]Lichtman and Rohrer, Systems, p. 15.

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burden: Thompson, "Burden of Proof," p. 50; Roger E.
Nebergall, "The Negative Counterplan," <u>The Speech Teacher</u>,
6 (1957), 217-20; Wisner, p. 13.

[51]Thompson, <u>Modern Argumentation</u>, p. 91.

[52]Austin J. Freely, <u>Argumentation and Debate: Rational
Debate: Techniques of a Free Society</u>, 2nd ed. (New York:
Macmillan, 1964), pp. 21, 198.

[54]Glenn E. Mills, <u>Reason in Controversy: On General
Argumentation</u>,2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn, 1968), p. 56.

[55]Musgrave, 3rd ed. 1957, pp. 132-34.

[56]Ulrich, p. 4.

[57]The following texts supported solvency of the affirmative
need as the only component of competitiveness, or mention no
other components: Ehninger and Brockreide, pp. 243-44;
Hayworth and Capel, p. 39; Kruger, <u>Modern Debate</u>, pp. 55-56;
Smith and Hunsaker, pp. 148-49; Lichtman and Rohrer, "The
Role of the Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of
Academic Debate," in <u>Modern Debate Case Techniques</u>, ed. Donald
R. Terry (Skokie: National Textbook, 1970), pp. 56-57. These
texts considered accrual of affirmative need to be a component
of competitiveness: Bauer, p. 39; Braden and Bradenburg,
pp. 438-39; Capp and Capp, pp. 45, 51; C. William Colburn,
<u>Strategies for Educational Debate</u>, (Boston: Holbrook, 1972),
pp. 157-59; Dick, pp. 57-58; Eubank, p. 115; McBurney
O'Neill, and Mills, p. 167; Musgrave, 3rd ed., 1957, pp. 132-34;
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, pp. 36, 51; Rowland and Eubank.
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Counterplan in a Question of Policy," <u>Quarterly Journal of
Speech</u>, 29 (1943), 48-52; McCrosky, p. 21; and Deborah Elise
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in <u>Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice, and Teaching</u>,
ed., David A. Thomas (1974; rpt. Skokie: National Textbook,
1975), pp. 160-63.

[58]Bauer, p. 39; Terry, pp. 56-57; Thompson, <u>Modern
Argumentation</u>, pp. 90-91; Freely, pp. 219-22; Pacilio and Stites,
p. 6; Wood, pp. 28-30.

[59] Lichtman and Rohrer, <u>Counterplan</u>, pp. 74-78.

[60] Ulrich, pp. 4-5.

[61] The following supported mutual exclusivity as a standard for competition; Braden and Brandenburg, pp. 438-39; Dick, pp. 57-58; Eubank, p. 115; Freely, pp. 219-22; O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, pp. 36, 51; Rowland and Eubank, pp. 72-73; Thompson, <u>Modern Argumentation</u>, pp. 90-91; Ziegelmueller and Dause, pp. 178-79; Colburn, pp. 157-59; and McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, pp. 41-42. Bauer, p. 39; Capp and Capp, p. 51; Musgrave, 2nd ed., 1945, p. 17; and Picilio and Stites, p. 6 requires some plan inconsistency. Journal articles calling for plan competitiveness are: Lambertson, pp. 48-52; Lichtman and Rohrer, <u>Counterplan</u>, pp. 70-79; and Ziegler, pp. 160-63.

[62] Musgrave, 3rd ed., 1957, p. 17.

[63] Gregory W. Trianosky, "Counterplan as a Competitive System," in <u>Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching</u>, ed. David A. Thomas (1974; rpt. Skolie: National Textbook, 1975), pp. 164-67.

[64] Lichtman and Rohrer, <u>Counterplan</u>, pp. 70-79.

[65] Fred Sanders, Letter, "Some Reflections on a 'General Theory of the Counterplan' or Let's Get Back to Sane Argument," <u>Journal of the American Forensic Association</u>, 13 (1977), 224-27.

[66] Lichtman and Rohrer, <u>Counterplan Reaffirmed</u>, pp. 235-39.

[67] See, for example: Freely, p. 222.

[68] J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament," <u>Journal of the American Forensic Association</u>, 11 (1974), pp. 61-71.

[69] See, for example: Ziegelmueller and Dause, pp. 178-79.