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AN ATTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION ANXIETY

Jim Quiggins

Nearly everyone experiences at some time difficulty in communicating effectively, although some individuals have problems more often and in more contexts than others. Difficulties in communicating effectively have been studied intensively for many years.[1] Communication inadequacy has been variously defined as a failure to speak where appropriate (e.g., reticence and stage fright), as a high rate of non-fluency (e.g., stuttering), as a set of behaviors that interfere with audience comprehension (e.g., figiting), and as a failure to be open with others (e.g., low self disclosure). Since many of these behaviors are accompanied by self reported and overt anxiety,[2] anxiety as a cause of communication inadequacy has been a major focus of attention in journals, convention programs, and academic departments in the speech communication discipline. This paper presents an analysis of communication anxiety that considers recent research in the area of attribution theory and offers suggestions for the development of theory and treatment.

Current Treatment Problems

Many treatments of communication inadequacy are designed to reduce anxiety. These include massed practice, peer feedback, and behavior modification. All have had varying degrees of success. One reason for differences in the outcomes of treatment programs regardless of their content is that criteria for success differ. As Cook[3] describes evaluation, some programs

re designed and evaluated in accord with a "medical" model hereas others use a "tailoring" model. The medical model ssumes that the program treats the cause of a problem that has number of symptoms. A wide variety of symptoms and side ffects are measured, some long after treatment and in quite ifferent contexts. For example, the effects of a class in peech anxiety might be evaluated by measuring self-reported ase in making new friends six months later. The tailoring odel is used by those who wish to tailor a specific program f treatment to a specific set of behaviors. With this model, he behavioral objectives of the treatment, rather than broader bjectives, are measured. Thus, the effects of repetition in he speech anxiety class might be measured by immediately retest- ng students' fluency on the specific oral tasks they practiced uring class sessions. Obviously, it is less difficult to demon- trate the success of treatment when outcomes are identified and easured in accord with the tailoring model than with the medical odel. This would explain why Paul's[4] research on disensitization, sing the tailoring model of problem identification and outcome easurement, demonstrated a very high effectiveness for desen- itization, whereas Kleinsasser's,[5] using a medical model, did ot.

One reason for the choice of a medical model of evaluation s theoretical preference. Those for whom communication anxiety s a general trait with many behavioral symptoms are likely to hoose the medical model, even though positive outcomes are arder to demonstrate. But it is now known that neither com- unication inadequacy, nor anxiety, are entities that a person

has or does not have.[6] Communication dysfunctions may be caused by insufficient or inappropriate learning, by physical defects, by an unwillingness to share the common definition of appropriate behavior (as when a T-Group member refuses to talk because he rejects the openness norm) or simply by a misunderstanding of what is desirable communication behavior in a particular situation. Furthermore, anxiety in any one person varies greatly with the psychological situation, the setting and time. This being the case, an anxiety reduction treatment may not help those persons who communicate inadequately for reasons other than anxiety or whose behavioral problem is unrelated to outcome goals of the treatment. Treatment programs designed to reduce anxiety ought to be effective in improving communication adequacy just with those persons whose inadequacy is either caused or exacerbated by anxiety and whose inadequacy is actually related to the behavior focused upon in treatment and measured later. Such programs will be developed, however, only to the extent that the concept of communication anxiety, itself, is well understood. Two important questions to be answered are: (1) under what conditions do anxiety states cause specific communication problems, and (2) what are the causes of these anxiety states and their persistence.

Conceptual Difficulties

Current conceptions of communication anxiety as a general attribute limit the development of tailored treatments and restrict more sophisticated theory and research. The development of effective treatment for communication anxiety as well

as theory, depends upon a more complex definition of the concept. Although communication theorists have drawn upon research in experimental psychology that demonstrates how anxiety affects performance[7] (i.e., anxiety arousal interferes with the performance of complex tasks and causes avoidance of situations which are associated with anxiety), they have not as yet been much influenced by empirical and theoretical advances in social psychology. A body of literature that deals with inference and the assignment of casualty--known as attribution theory--offers a multi-dimensional conceptualization of anxiety. When this theory is applied to communication anxiety, it may better account for its occurrence and persistence and provide important implications for measurement and treatment.

Communication Anxiety as Multidimensional

A tendency to be anxious in communication situations may be specific to only a few settings (e.g., speaking in public) or may be characteristic in many different communication situations, or may even be part of a generalized anxiety which is aroused in many facets of an individual's life.[8] Anxiety, therefore, may be conceived along a continuum of pervasiveness. Many theorists impose the terms "state" and "trait" on each end of the continuum. Because of the frequent confusion in both technical and everday language we should briefly distinguish between state and trait anxiety. There are, however, far more thorough and adequate treatments of this issue available.[9]

State anxiety is used to describe anxious arousal to a specific group of stimuli, say interpersonal interaction, or

public speaking, or physical danger. Many people, for example, experience anxiety when speaking before a large audience but not in a small group. Researchers whose concern is primarily with state anxiety emphasize the importance of identifying situations that evoke anxiety in many individuals. Trait anxiety refers to a relatively enduring personality trait whereby an individual is predisposed to respond with anxiety behavior to a wide range of stimuli. Here the emphasis is on individual differences. The specific situations that arouse the anxious response are assumed to be not easily identified and are of secondary concern in treatment.

Even this state-trait conception of anxiety is too simplistic. Recent studies of anxiety support an interaction model of anxiety whereby persons are assumed to be more or less predisposed to be anxious in particular situations. For example, one person might be inclined to be anxious in situations where threat to self-esteem is possible; another might be disposed to anxiety only in strange or new situations (both would tend to score high on a unidimensional test).

Whether or not communication anxiety is unidimensional is perhaps so far unknown, but certainly, recent experiments raise the possibility that it is not. Endler[10] has shown that there are at least four different kinds of trait anxiety (interpersonal, physical danger, ambiguous, and daily routine), each of which can be manifested in at least three different response modes (approach, avoidance, and autonomic). This work suggests that, pervasiveness held constant, people who are predisposed to react with avoidance of public speaking for example may be quite different

from those who avoid interpersonal interaction in small groups. Perhaps the various terms for communication anxiety, such as apprehension, reticence and stage fright, actually refer to different trait-state continua.

Pervasiveness (trait-state), situation type, and response mode are thus three categories of communication anxiety important to consider in developing theory and treatment. A fourth category (or more accurately, set of categories), cognitive attribution, is undoubtedly of equal importance even though consideration of attribution phenomena has not yet much influenced theorists, researchers and practioners in the field of communication anxiety.

Anxiety as an Emotion

Attribution dimensions define the extent to which a person congitively labels an aroused physical state as the emotion of anxiety and, also, the extent to which he attributes his state of emotion to some factor within himself, such as a personality trait, or to some situational factor, such as an unsympathetic audience. Another consideration is whether or not some behavioral communication difficulty is attributed to anxiety. All three attribution processes will, we argue, affect the development and persistence of communication anxiety and the effectiveness of various treatments for it.

Recognition of the first process followed the discovery that anxiety, itself, has at least two components. These components are (1) autonomic arousal, and (2) the cognitive

assignment of the label "anxiety" to that arousal, which in interaction may contribute to the individual's behavioral problems.

Arousal, whatever its cause, is known to increase the rate of responding whether responses are appropriate or inappropriate. Futhermore, arousing stimuli are distracting, drawing attention away from task performance to the salient arousing stimuli and to the person's own physiological state. Anxiety as it is usually defined, however, is more than arousal because it is perceived by the individual to be a negative emotional state. The negative effects of arousal are much exacerbated when arousal is defined by the person as anxiety. In this case, the drive has a directive (i.e., to lower arousal or avoid increasing it) which may compete with task requirements and is a socially undesirable emotional state. This is similar to what Wendell Johnson referred to some time ago as "semantogenic disability." As Johnson suggested,

> . . .The number of weaknesses 'available' to most of us is probably great enough to provide a pausible disability for almost any occasion. And we can be direct about it, 'using' a sore throat to avoid a speaking engagement, or we can be subtle and discover that we have an ailing back.[11]

This does not mean, however, that all such semantogenic "ailments" are produced at will and with full awareness of the motives involved. On the contrary, it is the non-awareness that often causes exacerbation. Moreover, if the individual labels a large number of arousal states as anxiety and feels that it reflects a characteristic of his personality, his self concept will be affected negatively.

Recently some research has focused upon the conditions under which a state of arousal becomes attributed as an emotion. This research was stimulated by Schachter's conceptualization of emotion[12] which is concerned with the attribution of cause to physiological arousal. Schachter and others contend that a straightforward reinforcement model does not account for states of intense emotion, particularly when they persist over time. Love, hate, anger and anxiety are not necessarily responses to actual rewarding or punishing stimuli, nor is it possible to predict what emotion will be felt by an objective analysis of the situation. People may fall in love with those who punish them, hate those who comfort them, and feel communication anxiety even when their receivers are sympathetic.[13]

Schachter proposes that attributed emotion depends upon a state of physiological arousal being identified by the individual as an emotional state. Moreover, arousal alone is not sufficient to cause a feeling of emotion, but does provoke a need to explain the cause of the arousal. If an individual perspires, feels flushed, or feels "butterflies in his stomach" when talking with a new acquaintance, for example, he will search to find the cause for his physical symptoms. In doing so, the individual looks to his environment for the explanation of his upset state. If the cues in the situation indicate that his arousal is simply a physical response (such as due to illness or to drugs), he will look no further for an explanation and will not attribute his arousal as emotion. In the absence

of a known physical cause, the individual will find a reason for his physical symptoms in the setting, or in the behavior of others, or in his personality. This attribution of cause permits the individual to attach an emotional label to his physical state. For example, a speaker who is aroused and perceives his audience as unfriendly may identify his feeling as anxiety. In future similar circumstances the assignment of the anxiety label may persist regardless of the nature of the audience, so that the individual may now attribute his anxiety to something within himself. On the other hand, if a speaker is aroused but views his audience as supportive, he may label his arousal as excitement and enjoy the experience, as well as subsequent similar experiences.

Schachter and Singer[14] in a landmark study, increased the physiological arousal of subjects by giving them epinephrine (a drug which causes increased heart rate, palmar sweating, a flushed feeling, etc.). Those who knew they had been given a drug which caused their physical state reported they did not feel emotional. Those who were unaware of the drug's arousing effects, however, did say they felt an emotion. Moreover, the specific emotional label they attached to their physical state depended upon situational cues. When another person, a confederate, was euphorically playing around in the room (e.g., flying paper airplanes or throwing paper wads) the subjects reported they felt happy. If the confederate became angry when asked to answer a questionnaire which

contained personal items and stamped from the room, however, the subject likewise reported he felt angry. In the same circumstances, subjects without epinephrine did not report as much emotion.

The results of this study can be generalized to communication anxiety. Autonomic arousal is present at relative levels where we communicate with others because the encounter generally requires attentiveness, concentration, and activity. Furthermore, since each time we interact we are implicitly seeking validation,[15] the possibility of embarrassment, rejection or negative feedback from others heightens the possibility of arousal. As noted above, this state of arousal may or may not be attributed to anxiety depending on previous experiences and the anticipation of outcomes of the encounter by the individual. Expectations about the relationship will affect how situational cues are perceived and whether the individual labels his arousal as anxiety will depend upon the interaction of actual situational cues with his perceptions of them. The apparent anxiety of others, difficult task requirements, negative feedback, or even subtle cues from a leader that the individual is expected to be anxious may lead to the attribution of anxiety. Since many interpersonal situations are likely to be ambiguous in terms of social norms and appropriate behavior (i.e., politeness norms and social roles may disguise actual feelings), an individual's expectations about himself and others should heavily influence what emotion he attributes to himself. What if an individual characteristically assigns labels such as "nervousness," "fear," "anxiety,"

etc. to quite normal arousal which could have just as well been defined as "enthusism," "excitement," "surprise," and so on? People who expect to fail in gaining the approval of others, for example, may typically label arousal as "anxiety" when engaged in a social situation when the real reason for the arousal may have been another's unusual friendliness or physical attractiveness. Thus, a person's expectations when entering a relationship or encounter, as well as his self-concept, are important factors in the self-identification or labeling of arousal states when communicating; they determine, along with situational factors, whether he feels exhilarated and thrilled, simply excited, or dread.

Attribution of Trait vs. State

Just as theorists are likely to blame communication anxiety more or less on dispositional or situational factors, individuals experiencing anxiety will also do so. Theories of attribution developed by such theorists as Fritz Heider and Harold Kelley[16] are useful for explaining, not just how the emotional state of communication anxiety develops in a particular situation, but also in understanding why some people have a predisposition to be anxious in particular communication settings.

In all versions of attribution theory, individuals are assumed to interpret and explain their world. The theory assumes that people are motivated to assign cause for behavior so they can better understand their world. Heider refers to this process as the "naive analysis of behavior," suggesting that we are all naive psychologists. His version of

attribution theory is concerned with how observers explain the behavior of others, but several authors have extended the theory to examine the causal interpretations that individuals apply to themselves.[17] There is experimental support for the notion that we attribute to ourselves, not just emotions as in Schacter's theory, but also attitudes, beliefs, and personal dispositions. For example, we seem to attribute to ourselves a particular degree of ability by observing our own behavior, just as we infer the emotions, attitudes, abilities and dispositions of others by observing their behavior.

The Attribution of Attitude and Motivation

Bem, in attempting to provide an alternative interpretation for cognitive dissonance, suggested our behavior may predispose our attitude rather than vice versa. For example, we will say we like brown beans if we always eat them.[18] In the same manner, we may believe that we enjoy public speaking or one-to-one interaction because we do a great deal of it. This is a form of psycho-logic based on the common assumption that people act in accord with their beliefs and motives. The same sort of logic causes an individual to infer a lower degree of personal enjoyment for communicating if his behavior is required by his job or other external demands. If there is sufficient justification in the environment for his speaking in public, for example, he is less likely to attribute his behavior (i.e., speaking) to personal predilections. The perception of high personal choice to engage in communication,

therefore, may promote a positive regard for doing so, if it is actually performed. If not, high perceived choice would lead to the attribution that he did not think it would be effective or that he avoided speaking for any other number of dispositional reasons. One of these, of course, includes being too anxious to communicate.

Conversely, forced communication should reduce the tendency to infer that a person communicates because he likes to do so, and having made that inference, it will be much more probable that the individual will attribute his states of arousal to anxiety or some other emotional state. Once the anxiety attribution has been made, chances are the person will choose not to communicate. In that event, he will likely develop a negative attitude toward communicating. We now have a perpetuative cycle such that the greater the anxiety, the greater the inference that one fails to communicate because of an internal emotional state; and the greater the inference that one does not enjoy communicating or is not motivated to do so, the greater the likelihood of further reluctance to speak or communicate in similar situations.

In sum, communication anxiety is likely to develop when the person attributes his communication behavior to a negative attitude or low motivation. These internal states, in turn, are probable attributions when one perceives he has chosen not to communicate or communicated with little choice. The perception of choice, of course, does not necessarily reflect actual choice.

The Attribution of Communication Ability or Adequacy

An attribution of little personal desire to communicate is, of course, not the only source of communication anxiety. Attribution theory suggests that the attribution of a stable, internal cause for failure in communication encounters (i.e., low ability or lack of skill) will also increase the likelihood that a person may consider himself to suffer from communication anxiety.

Weiner et. al.[19] contend that attributions made by observers for success or failure may be classified into broad classifications, internal and external. Dispositional factors within the individual such as his ability or motivation are classified as internal causes of behavior, and luck on the other hand, are examples of external causes or influences. Of the two general dispositional factors (motivation and ability), ability is considered by most people to be the most stable.[20] Furthermore, consistent performance (successful or unsuccessful) is most often seen by observers as due to the actor's individual ability, wheras, inconsistent performance is more likely to be attributed to factors such as intent or effort.

This same sort of process occurs when an individual makes attributions about his own behavior. People assess the likelihood that success or failure was caused primarily by the situation or by internal attributes or by both. They also attribute cause to variable factors, such as luck or motivation, or to more stable factors such as, difficulty of the endeavor

or ability. Several studies support the notion that self-observers characteristically attribute causality to aspects of the situation while observers of other's behavior tend to attribute causality to the individual's disposition.[21]

One reason the self observer may place greater emphasis upon situational elements in explaining his own behavior is because the ability to respond differentially to varying situations enhances his sense of control of the environment. There are also other cues which a person might use to assign cause for his own behavior.

Past experience in similar situations and observations of others create expectations against which an individual may judge his performance and determine its cause. When people consistently perform or communicate "better" or "worse" than others, the inference is likely to be that the task or situation determined the outcome than it is that something within is responsible. Attribution theory predicts, therefore, that the greatest self-attribution of high or low ability will occur when a person invariably succeeds or fails more than others do in the same or closely similar situations.

Most individuals are moderately successful in communicating. They seldom even think about why they are successful, except perhaps when they are unexpectedly highly successful, at which time they will probably attribute their success to their own efforts. Likewise, if they happen to "fail" unexpectedly, they will probably attribute the outcome to unusual task difficulty, luck, or a momentary lapse of effort. For example: "I received an A on my oral report

because I kept my cool," or "Sure I did poorly! Anybody would if people were shouting questions at you the whole time." The obvious general principle is that a majority of consistent successful experiences allows an individual to "shake off" occasional failure as due to bad luck, poor timing, or any other plausible external factor.

What about individuals who have not been successful in their attempts to communicate and may even have been consistently unsuccessful as they see it. In this case, the self-attributions tend to be reversed. That is, successful experiences are the unexpected and will most likely be attributed to good luck or an exceptionally easy task or situation, whereas, failure will be attributed to personal, internal inadequacies. For example: "I only got the job because it doesn't require any contact with people," or "I knew they wouldn't hire me because I'm not good at talking to strangers."

Furthermore, the consistently "unsuccessful" communicator may make unusual distorted attributions of causality for other's behavior and communication outcomes. That is, the individual may have an inflated view of other's superiority in situations in which he himself characteristically feels inadequate or inferior. He may perceive others as considerably more successful or having more responsibility for their success than even others perceive themselves. Successful experiences of others as he perceives them, seem accountable

to the person's dispositional or internal factors while failures are attributed to environmental or external factors.

As these kinds of attributions continue, the individual's self-confidence and self-esteem may become progressively lower, and he will become more anxious about communicating. He attributes more anxiety to himself when he does communicate or even contemplates doing so and avoidance behavior becomes the only apparent way to maintain any self-respect. This creates a cycle of intrapersonal mistrust which is actually self-defeating to maintenance of self-esteem and serves to promote more internal attribution for failure. Anxiety and demonstrable lack of skill each provides evidence of more general failure as a person, and the assumption of low self-worth in turn increases the likelihood of anxiety and failure. In most cases individuals who experience communication apprehension and make these kinds of attributions resign themselves to the "fact" that they are poor communicators, and are, except in isolated situations with people they perceive as accepting. Although in the latter situations their communication is usually unrestrained, spontaneous, and open, they are convinced that they are not effective "talkers." They persist in attributing nonapprehensive behavior in isolated relationships as externally caused. It may be that an individual can become so resigned to his self-concept that he begins to accept it, which could strengthen his self-esteem and suggests that he may "grow out of" his anxiety. On the other hand, most

of these people experience continually greater dissatisfaction with themselves and their ability (as they perceive it) causing them psychological discomfort and continued withdrawal from varied relationships.

The Persistence of Negative Attributions

It has been suggested that emotionally negative attributions concerning motive and ability cause an individual to act in ways that further exaggerate anxiety and lend to increase failure or avoidance in communicative situations. Both avoidance and perceptions of inadequacy in turn prompt the making of more negative attributions. There are two other factors that also contribute to this self-fulfilling prophecy: the lack of consensual validation and negative validation.

Since social reality cannot ordinarily be measured with yardsticks, tape measures, or weights, individuals use others to discover what is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate and so forth. This social comparison process[22] also is used to help attribute causes for behavior and to validate self-perceptions. The behavior of others and their responses to an individual give some idea as to whether a person's inference about "reality"--including himself--are correct or not. Positive appraisals serve to enhance self-esteem and may force reexamination of personal defeat or failure so as to encourage external or variable attributions of cause, rather than stable internal attribution. If an individual avoids seeking the opinion of others because

ne expects and fears negative evaluation, he also eliminates the possibility of receiving the positive validation he so desperately needs.

In situations where the cause for a negative outcome is construed as internal and reflecting an inferiority, an individual may avoid social interaction and exposure of what he preceives as an embarrassing or shameful attribute. The failure or inability to use social consensus to check out his evaluations can lead to further self-ascriptions of abnormality and personal inadequacy that can be profoundly debilitating. This condition also promotes an oversensitivity concerning the individual's own behavior, such that the communicator may continually monitor his own behavior and tend to interpret behaviors that are common and normal to be abnormal. This pattern of response is similar to what has also been referred to as "social alienation." Giffin has synthesized a number of alienation studies including research which has investigated the relationship between social alienation and speech anxiety. In the synthesis article of his research and other, Giffin points out the characteristic patterns of social alienation and communication anxiety as low self-image, low trust of others, high motivation to avoid failure, and low motivation to achieve success.[23] As we noted earlier, these attributions of inadequacy create a cycle whereby interaction is avoided for fear of confirming the inadequacy, but the avoidance itself may be perceived as verification anyway.

Suppose, however, that an individual does not yet have a firm attribution for his communication inadequacy. Perhaps he is simply seeking help for inadequacy that he attributes to a simple lack of skill and is not yet attributed to severe anxiety or inability. In this case, negative feedback from others will exaggerate the mildly negative attribution. If others label him as anxious or hostile he has received social validation for a negative trait as well as an emotional explanation for the arousal he experiences when communicating.

The following postulates taken from this analysis provide a concise summary of the conceptual position offered in this paper.

1. Communication anxiety is a situation-specific emotion and is therefore, multi-dimensional in its conceptual nature with cognitive attributions of causality for arousal and for communication behavior or skills as important dimensions.

2. Individuals who tend to experience communication anxiety in a given situation will characteristically attribute the cause for their own and others success or failure as related to the situation differently than those who do not tend to experience communication anxiety. Specifically:

    a) Personal self-success will be perceived as caused primarily by external or situational factors;
    b) Personal self-failure will be perceived as caused primarily by internal or dispositional factors;
    c) Other's success will be perceived as caused primarily by internal or dispositional attributes of the person;
    d) Other's failure will be perceived as caused by external or situational factors rather than the person's dispositional attributes.

3. Individuals who tend to experience communication anxiety will characteristically assign more labels with a negative valence to their physiological arousal than will individuals who do not tend to experience communication anxiety.

4. Persistent labeling of behavior or arousal as "anxiety" or similar negative labels will exacerbate the phenomenon and establish a cycle of additional dysfunctional behavior and cognitive attribution.

Implications for Measurement and Treatment of Communication Anxiety

The implications of this reasoning for current methods of measurement and treatment of communication anxiety are that these methods may provide some people with a negative attribution or label and in fact exacerbate the very problem which the treatment is designed to reduce. Tests for communication apprehension or anxiety which have items concerning specific states of arousal (e.g., palmar sweating when speaking) and specific behaviors (e.g., hesitations or nonfluencies) may lead an individual to conclude that if these attributes are characteristic of his state while he communicates that he has something known as "communication anxiety." That is, the measurement may be reactive in that it supplies a dispositional label for symptoms and difficulties when an external attribution may not only be more functional but more appropriate, since the situation described by the test item is generally arousing for everyone.

Therapy or treatment for communication anxiety may also lead to a greater internal attribution of communication inadequacy, since the treatment assumes the person "has" an anxiety problem and, further, by focusing on what he feels and does, assumes that the problem is caused by him rather than by his environment. Treatment techniques that are in themselves of little help may exacerbate the problem because anxiety that fails to respond to treatment

seems decidely serious. Finally, the tendency for observers to attribute the behavior of others to dispositional traits rather than to situational factors may lead to dispositionally inclined feedback by therapists, teachers and peers.[24] For example, treatment of communication anxiety through strictly T-group training methods may cause an individual to make more internal attributions for his inadequacy because in giving feedback group members will tend to see another's state as internally caused. This information will cause the individual to feel more responsible for his inadequacies but not necessairly more prepared to deal with them.

Some might argue that recognition of one's problem is a necessary basis for successful treatment. The attribution theorists, however, would counter that some forms of recognition are dysfunctional instead. Valins and Nisbett[25] suggest that under certain circumstances people may develop dispositional explanations for their behavior when situational explanations may be more appropriate. Citing case examples from personal accounts by John Neale and work by Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo[26] and Davison,[27] they argue that emotional disorders often result from inappropriate attributions and that by providing a patient with a "normal" explanation for his behavior, his dysfunctional behaviors or attitudes may disappear. They even suggest that this kind of reattribution, or assessment therapy does not necessarily require a therapist. Reattributions are possible simply through interaction with friends who offer different

interpretations to the actor for his own behavior or feelings. For example, an individual might be convinced by them that his glibness with intimates reflects his true self more than does his lack of interaction in class.

Since the anxiety experienced has two components, the physiological and the cognitive (through attributional processes and label attachment), the treatment should attack both aspects. The widely used systematic desensitization[28] approach operating from a conditioning model, focuses primarily on the physiological state. While this treatment may reduce autonomic arousal, dysfunctional and inappropriate attributions may persist. Futhermore, the newly acquired lack of arousal produced by the conditioning may be attributed to the systematic desensitization as an external factor, realizing no re-identification of the emotion reported by the apprehensive individual. Perhaps the most important aspect of the treatment is that any progress in terms of alleviating the anxiety must be attributed by the patient to his own ability or effort and not to external forces.

With the exception of a few studies, the discovery of the relationship of attribution processes with communication anxiety remains relatively unexplored.[29] Theoretically the existence of a relationship has merit, and research in related areas has substantiated the importance of causal attributions in understanding human behavior.

FOOTNOTES

Jim Quiggins (Ph.D., University of Kansas, 1976) is Chairperson of the Department of Communication Studies at Trevecca Nazerene College, Nashville, Tennessee.

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[19]Weiner, I. Frieze, A. Kukla, L. Reed, S. Rest, and R.M. Rosenbaum, "Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure," In E.E. Jones et.al., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971).

[20]Irene Frize and Bernard Weiner, "Cue Utilization and Attributional Judgments for Success and Failure," Journal of Personality, 39 (1971), 591-605.

[21]Leslie Z. McArthur, "The How and What of Why: Some eterminants of and Consequences of Causal Attributions," Journal f Personality and Social Psychology, 22 (1972) 171-193.

M. D. Storms,"Videotape and the Attribution Process," ournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27 (1973) 165-175.

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[22]Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Scoial Comparison Processes," uman Relations, 7 (1954), 117-140.

Roland Radloff, "Social Comparison and Ability Evaluation," ournal of Experimental Social Psychology Supplement, 1 (1966), -16.

[23]Kim Giffin, and Barbara Groginsky, "A study of the elationship Between Social Alienation and Speech Anxiety," ommunication Research Center Report No. 3], University of Kansas 1970).

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[25]Stuart Valins and Richard E. Nisbett, "Attribution Processes n the Development and Treatment of Emotional Disorders," In E. E. ones, et. al., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971).

[26]Lee D. Ross, Judith Rodin, and Philip G. Zimbardo, "Toward n Attribution Therapy: The Reduction of Fear Through Induced ognitive-Emotional Misattribution," Journal of Personality and ocial Psychology, 12 (1969), 279-288.

[27]Gerald C. Davison, "Differential Relaxation and Cognitive structuring in Therapy with a 'Paranoid Schizophrenic' or 'aranoid State'," Proceedings of the American Psychological sociation, (1966), 177-178.

[28]James C. McCroskey, David C. Ralph, and J. E. Barrick, "The ffect of Systematic Desensitization on Speech Anxiety," Speech eacher, 19 (1970), 32-36.

[29]Some studies that take this perspective are:

Sara B. Kiesler, "Emotion in Groups," Journal of Humanistic ychology, 13 (1973), 19-31.

Sara B. Kiesler and Barbara Coffman, "Emotions in Experiential Groups: Effects of Arousal and Trainer Cues," unpubl. ms. thesis University of Kansas, 1975.

Vicki S. Freimuth, "The Effects of Communication Apprehension on Communication Effectiveness," Human Communication Research, 2 (1976), 289-298.

THE EFFECTS OF DOGMATISM ON MESSAGE FORMULATION

Craig Allen Smith

Over a span of four decades many psychologists have explored the nature of the "authoritarian personality."[1] Perhaps the most lucid description of the general "Authoritarian Character Structure" is contained in a 1943 article by Abraham Maslow, who describes eight characteristics:

1. A Tendency to Hierarchy -- "regard most or all human beings as challenging rivals who are either superior (and therefore to be feared, resented, bootlicked and admired); or inferior (and therefore to be scorned, humiliated, and dominated). People are ranked on a vertical scale as if they were on a ladder, and they are divided into those above and below."
2. A Tendency to Generalize Superiority-Inferiority Relationships
3. A Drive for Power
4. Hostility, Hatred and Prejudice
5. A Unitary Scale of Values -- other scales become threats.
6. A Tendency to Identify Kindness with Weakness
7. Sadistic-Masochistic Tendencies -- when dominant the authoritarian is sadistic, when submissive it is masochistic.
8. Virtually Impossible to Satisfy any of these needs.
9. Guilt Feelings and Conflicts[2]

In 1950, T. W. Adorno et al introduced the California F Scale to measure authoritarianism. But since their primary purpose was to explore the bases of anti-semitism and facism, rather than pure authoritarianism, the F Scale exhibits a strong liberal bias.[3]

To correct for this and other methodological weaknesses in the F Scale, Milton Rokeach devised the Dogmatism (D) Scale to tap general or topic-free authoritarianism. He derived his theory from the premise that authoritarianism is related to the structure of one's belief/disbelief systems and is therefore independent of content.[4]

The research on Dogmatism to date has been voluminous. In their review of the literature nearly ten years ago, Vacchiano, Strauss, and Hochmann wrote that:

> All in all, if one can evaluate concepts by the amount and nature of research they stimulate, dogmatism, in a short period of time, has proven a potent formulation. It has provided a common denominator for such diverse areas as classroom teaching and personality development, interpersonal behavior and the employment of defense mechanisms.[5]

But what do we know about the relationship between Dogmatism and human communication?

Gerald Miller and others have studied the effects of Dogmatism on message reception fairly extensively. But to date we know little about the effects of Dogmatism on verbal behavior. This paper will attempt to synthesize our knowledge of Dogmatism as an encoding variable.

II

First, let us examine the literature to assertain the relationships between Dogmatism and some potentially encoder-related variables.

Vacchiano, Strauss, and Schiffman administered the D Scale and 58 diverse personality instruments to 82 college

students and concluded that high dogmatic individuals are characterized by a need for support and encouragement, an intolerance for the feelings and motives of others, a general reluctance to change and preference for the familiar despite inconsistencies, a lack of self-esteem and ego strength and a generally maladjusted personality.[6] When Bernhardsen and Fisher replicated the study, however, they found a number of spurious relationships. Since they were unable to tell precisely which were spurious, they recommend that we accept the Vacchiano results with caution.[7]

In terms of behavioral predispositions, we have evidence that Dogmatism is positively correlated with a rejection of minorities and change-related groups,[8] learning difficulties,[9] intolerance for ambiguity,[10] rapid decision-making after a limited information search,[11] and a tendency to avoid risky situations.[12]

We also have some evidence that Dogmatism is negatively correlated with creativity[13] and with scores on the Verbal College Qualification Test[14] (although Dogmatism tends to decrease with college education).[15]

There is some evidence that Dogmatism is a curvilinear predictor of the ability to differentiate between source and message.[16]

Ehrlich and Lee echo Maslow when they conclude that high Dogmatics tend to:

> hold negative beliefs about self and others, hold contradictory self-beliefs, engage in self-proselytization, seek status and power, report a sense of martyrdom, and display moral self-righteousness.[17]

Much research has explored the relationships between the D Scale, the F Scale, and conservatism. One group of studies suggests that the D Scale, like the F Scale before it, is not topic-free--that conservatives score higher than liberals.[18] A second school holds that the D Scale works as a measure of topic-free authoritarianism.[19] This group implies that conservatives might just be somewhat more authoritarian than liberals. A third group of studies has compared the constructs using factor analysis and found that F and D are related but discriminable entities.[20] Their data suggest that D and F are valid constructs when properly used, which may routinely correlate with conservatism.

But, significantly, none of this research has directly investigated the influence of D on message formulation.

III

In 1964, Haiman and Duns published the results of four experiments and concluded that:

> Results in all studies indicated that it was possible, with a modest but statistically significant degree of assurance, for observers to predict subjects' scores on dogmatism scales from their communicative behavior.[21]

Although one could argue that their results were more modest than significant, their feat is all the more intriguing because they did not identify the characteristics which signalled the differences between high and low Dogmatic sources. Essentially, they reported that a significant number of raters guessed correctly . Unfortunately, however, no one pursued this research.

But before we can hypothesize and substantiate relationships, we need to explore. There has been a healthy trend in recent years toward an appreciation of the "pre-scientific"[22] or hypothesis-generating functions of rhetorical criticism and content analysis.[23] Scheidel has suggested, for example, that we need different standards for evidence during different phases of inquiry:

> The perspective in the first phase is expansive, searching, scanning. The findings from multiple complimentary approaches are sought. Standards for evidence are relatively relaxed. Tacit knowledge and intuition are admissable for hypothesis development. More speech communication research of this type is needed.[24]

To this end I conducted three exploratory studies of the relationship between Dogmatism and encoding behavior. Collectively, they lead us toward some interesting hypothesis for more tightly controlled experimental research.

Dogmatism and Written Messages[25]

A total of 224 students in the introductory communication course at Purdue University (Fall, 1975) completed the Rokeach D and California F Scales. Later in the semester each was assigned a two-page persuasive message, aimed at converting a hostile audience to a position about which the source felt more strongly than any other.[26]

The messages were subjected to content analytical procedures using the thematic variables of topic[27] and stance,[28] two logical analyses derived from the writings of Stephen Toulmin[29] and Carroll Arnold,[30] and stylistic analysis based

upon average sentence length, "monolithic terms,"[31] and a typology of statements which had proved useful when investigating the "politically paranoid" discourse of the John Birch Society.[32]

The data (N=148) suggested four significant differences. First, both high and low groups used significantly more qualifiers per claim than did the moderates. Although such apparent curvilinearity is not novel, it is difficult to explain with respect to Rokeach's theory. Perhaps most reasonable is the contention that high D's qualify because they are somewhat defensive, while low D's qualify because they perceive finer shades of meaning.

Second, low D's sought significantly more factual judgments than did either medium or high D's. This could indicate that low D's are less evaluative than high D's.[33]

Finally, two stylistic variables -- assertions and questions -- were inversely related to dogmatism. The assertion rate suggests that low D's tend to rely on the inherent validity of their assertions, while increasing D leads them to more frequently ask and answer the question, "according to whom?"; this is consistent with John Kline's description of "people-oriented" and "content-oriented" individuals,[34] and is not inconsistent with his observation that high D's tend to more heavily document their arguments.[35]

The increase in questions could be related either to the high D's low self-esteem (and subsequent fear that his audience would provide the "wrong" answer to his question)

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The increase in questions could be related either to the high D's low self-esteem (and subsequent fear that his audience would provide the "wrong" answer to his question)

or to his desire to provide rather than seek information when in a position of dominance over his audience.

Perhaps most significant, these four sets of differences disappeared when the same analyses were partitioned according to scores on the California F Scale, despite a D-F correlation of .71 (significant beyond .001). This suggests that the discriminable differences between D and F include something strongly related to encoding behavior.

But as interesting as these results were, they failed to predict either relative or specific scores with statistically acceptable accuracy.

Dogmatism and Oral Messages[36]

Since a sizeable body of literature has described differences between oral and written messages,[37] and since Haiman and Duns reported differential ratings of oral, transcribed, written and interactive messages,[38] the first study was replicated to determine the effects of D and F on oral messages.

A total of 148 students in the introductory public speaking class at Memphis State University (Spring, 1977) were administered the F and D Scales. Later in the semester their instructors assigned them a five-minute speech to convert a hostile audience on the subject about which the speaker felt most strongly. The speeches were recorded (ostensibly to familiarize the students with microphone speaking) and subjected to content analytic procedures.[39]

Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the "written" study, none of the analyses attained significance at the .05 level. The discriminate analyses suggest two functions with F probabilities of .88 and .89, while the results of all the regregressions attain an r^2 value of only .19.[40] Clearly, D and the encoding behavior of this sample (with respect to the variables tested) were unrelated. Nor were there any statistically significant differences related to the California F Scale. Two possible explanations should be considered.

First, it is entirely possible that the difference between oral and written styles are such that they overcome the differences attributable to Dogmatism. Perhaps the effects of Dogmatism are brought forth only when an individual searches carefully for the "best" way to phrase a message. In such a case, Dogmatism would influence the writer's judgments as to caution, support and authority. For the speaker presenting a thematically prepared but extemporaneously phrased message, however, this would be less important than his primary goal of fluency. But this assumes that the subjects in the written study took great pains (or at least minimal discomfort) to forge their persuasive messages. This is an assumption that the author is somewhat reluctant to make, since most of the messages were scrawled in ink on notebook paper in a generally careless fashion. Nevertheless, the act of composing on paper involves an extra step which may be important in this regard.

A second possible explanation is that the differences in communicative behavior between the rural midwesterners from Purdue and the urban southerners from Memphis State were more important than either measure of authoritarianism. In either case, the results suggest that some intervening variable is more important to encoding behavior than dogmatism.

IV

The research to date enables us to formulate some general hypotheses for future research. We will divide them into sections for organizational purposes, although many of them are interconnected.[41]

A. Since much of the research suggests that D and F are related but discriminable entities, we may hypothesize that:

1. D is related to encoding behavior while F is not;

2. The influence of D on encoding behavior is secondary to other influences;

3. The effects of D on encoding behavior are not consistently positive, negative, or curvilinear;

4. High, medium and low D's tend to adopt similar verbal behaviors, presumably for different reasons;

5. High and low D's will use significantly more qualifiers per claim than moderates, but for different reasons.

B. Since D is related to a desire to avoid risk, low self-esteem and low creativity, we may hypothesize that:

6. When challenged, high D's should tend to reiterate or abandon arguments, while low D's should tend to justify and explain their argument;

7. High D's should prefer friendly to hostile audience to a greater degree than low D's;

8. Given the same audience, high D's should perceive it as generally hostile, low D's as generally uncommitted;

9. Given the opportunity, low D's should be more likely to attempt conversion;

10. Dogmatism should be inversely related to the ability to formulate new arguments;

11. Presented with an opportunity to advance a novel argument (e.g., debate), low D's should use it more frequently than high D's;

12. High D's should be better able to reproduce arguments for multiple audiences;

13. High D's should be more likely to reiterate arguments, phrases and evidence;

14. Low D's should ask more questions than high D's;

15. High D's will answer more of the questions they ask, unless it is a perceived friendly audience;

16. Low D's will not answer the questions they ask, unless it is a perceived hostile audience.

C. Since D is related to a tendency to hierarchy, and a tendency to generalize superiority-inferiority relationships, we may hypothesize that:

17. High D's should employ proportionately more supporting materials than low D's;

18. High D's should tend to be generally "people oriented," low D's more "content oriented" in their selection of evidence;

19. High D's should be more likely to expect audience deference to his sources;

20. When presented as an authority on his subject, high D's should tend to forego support and expect audience deference while low D's behavior should undergo little change;

21. High D's should be less likely to critique or evaluate their sources;

22. When faced with an ambiguous situation, low D's will describe it, while high D's will evaluate it.

D. Since D is related to the rejection of minorities and change, we may hypothesize that:

23. High D's should adopt anti-minority positions more frequently than low D's;

24. Of those expressing anti-minority views the majority should be high D's:

25. When a radical change is proposed, high D's should attempt to preserve the status quo despite possible flaws, medium D's should prefer modification of the status quo to alleviate the problem, and low D's should consider the proposal on its own merit.

E. Since D is negatively correlated with cognitive complexity and the ability to search for new information, we may hypothesize that:

26. High D's should have the most difficulty with semantic arguments;

27. Dogmatism should be negatively correlated with message length;

28. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with message oversimplification;

29. Dogmatism should be negatively correlated with message complication;

30. High D's should perform better than low D's on extemporaneous communication assignments;

31. Low D's should perform better than high D's on prepared speech assignments;

32. In a class involving equal weighting of prepared and extemporaneous assignments, medium D's should perform the best;

33. High D's should be most likely to defend their remarks, even when they are not overtly challenged.

F. Because D is related to moral self-righteousness, we may hypothesize that:

34. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with ideological subjects and arguments;

35. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with the vehemence of delivery;

36. Dogmatism will therefore consistently be confused by raters with:

    a. vehemence
    b. ego-involvement
    c. conservatism
    d. disagreement with the rater
    e. stubbornness
    f. conviction.

V.

The kind of research reported here is not intended to be conclusive. In the 23 years since Rokeach introduced the D Scale we have turned some stones. We have just begun to see that we have only looked at part of the process -- message reception.

The hypotheses presented here are suggestive. They are drawn from existing research and are intended to be tested using the rigorous procedures that Scheidel posits for "phase three" research. But as he warns, we must not be overly concerned with testing these or any other hypotheses. The important concern is that we test the theory as it is reflected in these hypotheses.

NOTES

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[1]The best known works are Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1965), Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswich, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), and Milton Rokeach, The Open-and Closed-Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

[2]Abraham H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," Journal of Social Psychology, 18 (November, 1943), 401-411.

[3]It is important to recall that this Fascist tendency was precisely the variable which Adorno et al hoped to measure. Unfortunately, the title of their book led many to misunderstand the F Scale's purpose. For a more thorough treatment of the F Scale and its weaknesses see Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1945).

[4]Rokeach introduced the D Scale in "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," Psychological Monographs, 70 (1965) No. 18 (whole no. 425): The Open-and Closed-Mind contains his original theory and scale as well as subsequent research.

[5]Ralph B. Vacchiano, Paul S. Strauss, and Leonard Hochman, "The Open-and Closed-Mind: A Review of Dogmatism, Psychological Bulletin, 71 (1968), 270.

[6]Ralph B. Vacchiano, Paul R. Strauss, and David C. Schiffman, "Personality Correlates of Dogmatism," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 32 (1968), 83-85.

[7]Clemens S. Bernhardson and Ronald J. Fisher, "Personality Correlates of Dogmatism: Methodological Problems," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 34 (1970), 449.

[8]Donald Kirtley and Richard Harkless, "Some Personality and Attitudinal Correlates of Dogmatism," Psychological Reports, 24 (1969), 851-854.

[9]Howard J. Ehrlich and Dorothy Lee, "Dogmatism, Learning and Resistance to Change: A Review and a New Paradigm," Psychological Bulletin, 71 (1969), 249-260.

[10]Joseph Zacker, "Authoritarian Avoidance of Ambiguity," Psychological Reports, 33 (December, 1973), 901-902; and Harvey J. Brightman and Thomas F. Urban, "The Influence of the Dogmatic Personality upon Information Processing: A Comparison with a Bayesian Information Processor," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 11 (April, 1974), 226-276.

[11]Ronald M. Taylor and Marvin D. Dunnette, "Influence of Dogmatism, Risk-taking Propensity and Intelligence on Decision-making Strategies for a Sample of Industrial managers," Journal of Applied Psychology, 59 (August, 1974), 420-423.

[12]Timothy G. Plax and Lawernce B. Rosenfeld, "Dogmatism and Decisions Involving Risk," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 41 (Spring, 1976), 266-277.

[13]Lynne Rouff, "Openness, Creativity and Complexity,"Psychological Reports, 37 (December, 1975), 1009-1010; and Jon Van Zaig, "An Investigation into 'The Open- and Closed-Mind,'" abstract appears in Dissertation Abstracts International,31 (September, 1970), 1524.

[14]Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., Joe E. Willis, Frederick Ikard, and John A. Dohme, "Dogmatism, Future Orientation and Perception of Time," Journal of Social Psychology, 73 (1967), 205-209.

[15]Ralph F. Berdie, "College Courses and Changes in Dogmatism," Research in Higher Education, 2 (1974), 133-143.

[16]Gilbert Becker, "Ability to Differentiate Message from Source as a Curvilinear Function of Scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale," Journal of Social Psychology, 72 (1967), 265-273.

[17]Dorothy E. Lee and Howard J. Ehrlich, "Beliefs About Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory," Psychological Reports, 28 (June, 1971), 919-922.

[18]See for example Kirtley and Harkless (1969); Frank Costin, "Dogmatism and Conservatism: An Empirical Follow-up of Rokeach's Findings," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 31 (Winter, 1971), 1007-1010; Robert C. Thompson and Jerry B. Michel, "Measuring Authoritarianism: A Comparison of the F and D Scales," Journal of Personality, 40 (June, 1972), 180-190; and James C. McCroskey and Michael Burgoon, "Establishing Predictors of Latitude of Acceptance-Rejection and Attitudinal Intensity: A Comparison of Assumptions of Social Judgment and Authoritarian Personality Theories," Speech Monographs, 41 (November, 1974), 421-426.

[19]See for example Herbert W. Simons, "Dogmatism Scales and Leftist Bias," Speech Monographs, 35 (June 1968), 149-153; Herbert W. Simons and Nancy Neff Berkowitz, "Rokeach's Dogmatism and Leftist Bias," Speech Monographs, 36 (November, 1969), 459-463; David J. Hanson, "Dogmatism Among Authoritarians of the Right and the Left," Psychological Studies, 14 (January, 1969), 12-21; David J. Hanson, "Dogmatism and Political Ideology," Journal of Human Relations, 18 (1970), 995-1002; David J. Hanson, "Dogmatism and Authoritarianism," Journal of Social Psychology, 76 (1968), 89-95; David J. Hanson, "Validity Test of the Dogmatism Scale," Psychological Reports, 26 (1970), 558-586; and David V. Stimpson and JoAnne D'Alo, "Dogmatism, Attitude Extremity, and Attitude Intensity as Determinants of Perceptual Displacement," Journal of Psychology, 86 (January, 1974), 87-91.

[20]Fred N. Kerlinger and Milton Rokeach, "The Factorial Nature of the F and D Scales," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (1966), 391-399 (in which the authors suggest that F factors are "authoritarian aggression," "submission to in-group authority," and "impulse control" and that D factors are "belief in one cause," "belief in one truth," "isolation-alienation," "self-proselytization," and an "unnamed factor"), and Peter B. Warr, R. E. Lee, and K. G. Joereskoeg, "A Note on the Factorial Nature of the F and D Scales," British Journal of Psychology, (1969), 119-123 (in which the authors suggested two common factors: "dogmatic opinionation" and "pragmatism," F factors "general authoritarianism," "personal morality," "nationalism," "institutional toughmindedness," and "personal toughmindedness," and one cause," "personal ambition," "virtuous self-denial," and "self-proselytization").

[21]Franklyn S. Hiaman and Donald F. Duns, "Validators of Communicative Behavior of Attitude-Scale Measures of Dogmatism," Journal of Social Psychology, 64 (1964), 296.

[22]John Waite Bowers, "The Pre-Scientific Function of Rhetorical Criticism," in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism (ed.) by Thomas Nilsen, (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 126-143.

[23]See especially Thomas M. Scheidel, "Evidence Varies with Phases of Inquiry," Western Speech Journal, 41 (Winter, 1977), 20-31; and Roderick P. Hart, "Theory-Building and Rhetorical Criticism: An Informal Statement of Opinion," Central State Speech Journal, 27 (Spring, 1976), 70-77.

[24]Scheidel, p. 30.

[25]Craig Allen Smith, "Communicative Characteristics of Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in Written Messages," The Central States Speech Journal, 29 (Winter, 1978), 293-303.

[26]Students were given no indication that these two tasks were related, nor was there any indication that they perceived a connection. Introductory classes were used to minimize the effects of college education on Dogmatism which were described by Berdie (1974). The conversion, hostility, important-topic paradigm was designed to elicit maximum ego-involvement.

[27]Topic categories were "Personal" (matters pertaining to an individual which need not involve society), "Social" (matters pertaining to the good of society at large, or personal matters approached from a normative perspective), "Political" (matters pertaining to the governing of society or the pursuit of power), "Economic" (matters pertaining to the distribution of resources within a society), "Recreational" (matters pertaining to the use of leisure time), "Religious" (matters pertaining to spiritual affairs of one's faith in a Supreme Being), "Educational" (matters pertaining to the institutionalized learning process), and "Scientific" (matters pertaining to research and technology). Although some of the essays could have been classified into multiple categories, each was assigned to that category which, in the coder's opinion, best summarized the composition's primary thrust.

[28]Stance categories were "Defend" (defend or protect the status quo), "Modify" (accept the status quo generally, but seek a specific change within it), "Destroy" (indict the status quo as cause of significant problems and argue for its repeal or revolution), and "Propose" (advocate a new course of action not embodied in the status quo. This may, in some cases, include destruction of the status quo).

[29]Coders determined whether each phase or statement functioned rhetorically as a "Claim" ("the conclusion whose merits we are seeking to establish"), "Data" ("the facts we

appeal to as a foundation for the claim"), "Warrant" ("rules, principles, inferences...which can act as bridges, and authorise the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us"), "Qualifier" ("indicating the strength conferred by the warrant on this step"), "Rebuttal" ("indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside"), or "Backing" ("standing behind our warrants...will normally be other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor currency"). A series of ratios were computed for each individual (e.g., qualifiers per claim, data per claim, backing per warrant, etc.) to permit comparison of logical styles of different speakers. For a more complete explanation of Toulmin's ideas see Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) especially pp. 94-145. For other examples of Toulminian criticism see Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46 (February, 1960), 44-53; and Roderick P. Hart, "On Applying Toulmin: The Analysis of Practical Discourse," in Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism (ed.) by Gerald P. Mohrman, Charles J. Stewart and Donovan J. Ochs (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1973), pp. 75-95.

[30]Arnold describes four types of judgments typically sought by communicators: "Factual" ("judgments accepting or rejecting the alleged existence, form, capacities, etc, or something"), "Optative" ("evaluative judgments endorsing or rejecting something on the basis of general personal or social preferences"), "Adjudicative" ("judgments on the conformity that exists or is lacking between things or events and formally agreed upon codes or standards"), and judgments "predictive of Desirability" ("evaluative judgments endorsing things on the basis of their desirability, feasability, potency, and so forth for the future"). For a more complete discussion see Carroll C. Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), p. 70. These judgmental analysis were used to determine the extend to which personality type would affect one's perception of the rhetorical task.

[31]"Monolithic terms" are words or phrases which convey an image of individuals or disparate things thinking or working in a concerted manner.

[32]Craig Allen Smith, "The Hofstadter Hypothesis Revisited: The Nature of Evidence in Politically 'Paranoid' Discourse," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42 (Spring, 1977), 279-280.

[33]Although one might infer that low D's therefore used more facts in support of their claims (than high D's), the data-to-claim ratio did not support this conclusion.

[34]John A. Kline, "A Q-Analysis of Encoding Behavior in The Selection of Evidence," Speech Monographs, 38 (June, 1971), 190-197.

[35]John A. Kline, "Dogmatism of the Speaker and Selection of Evidence," Speech Monographs, 38 (November, 1971), 354-355. For related material see Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965) in which the author cites the tendency to document as a characteristic of the "paranoid style;" and Paul I. Rosenthal, "Specificity, Verifiability and Message Credibility," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (December, 1971), 393-401 for a discussion of the credibility of documentation.

[36]Craig Allen Smith, "SPECIAL REPORT: Communicative Characteristics of Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in Oral Messages," The Central States Speech Journal, 29 (Winter, 1978), 304-307.

[37]See for example James W. Gibson, Charles R. Gruner, Robert J. Kibler, and Francis J. Kelly, "A Quantitative Examination of Differences and Similarities in Written and Spoken Messages," Speech Monographs, 33 (November, 1966), 444-451; Charles R. Gruner, Robert J. Kibler, and James W. Gibson, "A Quantitative Anlaysis of Selected Characteristics of Oral and Written Vocabularies," Journal of Communication, 17 (June, 1967), 152-158; Joseph DeVito, "Psychogrammatical Factors in Oral and Written Discourse by Skilled Communicators," Speech Monographs, 33 (March, 1966), 73-76; and Joseph DeVito, "A Linguistic Analysis of Spoken and Written Language," Central States Speech Journal, 18 (May, 1967), 81-85.

[38]In Experiment #1 Haiman and Duns reported that raters accurately predicted high D's in 83% of the cases from oral messages and only 63% when those same messages were transcribed. Conversely, the same raters accurately predicted low D in only 33% of the cases, and increased their accuracy to 67% when rating the transcriptions. Thus the transcriptions seem most reliable. In Experiment #2, ratings (by those familiar with the construct) of written messages were accurate predictions of high D in 88% of the cases, while the low D accuracy was only 36%.

[39]Although it was considerably more difficult to analyze recordings than transcriptions, the author felt it important to preserve the orality of the messages. The overall intercoder reliability coefficient for both studies was .75. Due to an unusual technical malfunction, the extremely important Toulminian analyses were invalid. More exploratory research using the Toulminian ratios is needed in light of the significant qualifier-to-claim ratio differences in the "written" study.

[40]This is consistent with Haiman and Dun's low accuracy of low D prediction, but very surprising in light of their 88% high D oral prediction. It suggests that delivery may account for a large part of the variance.

[41]These hypotheses are suggestive, not exhaustive. I do not intend to imply that any or all of them can be easily proven, or that there is no contrary or conflicting evidence. I am suggesting that we have sufficient confidence in them to warrant the rigors of "Phase three" research.

NEWS

Debbie Zimmerman, News Editor

-- High Schools --

This has been an active year in forensics for the high schools across the state. The week-end of April 19-21 closed the season as the THSSDL tournament was held at Memphis State University. Honors went to schools from across the entire state.

Reports indicate a very eventful year. Margaret Ann Reynolds, Director of Forensics at Battle Ground Academy, was proud of a debate team, Trey Fitts and Mike Steele, who placed in several tournaments during the year and won 1st in THSSDL District IV tournament. Battle Ground Academy also had honors going to Scott Frick in Oratory and Frank Lee in Interpretation of Poetry. Stuart Caulkins represented the district at the State Tournament in Extemporaneous Speaking.

At Sullivan Central High School in Blountville, TN, Mrs. Paula Bryant directed the popular musical Funny Girl with much success. Sullivan Central also had a student win first place in Radio TV Broadcasting at the THSSDL tournament.

Mrs. Nancy N. Pridemore at Dobyns-Bennett High School is very much involved in a story telling program with her students. They have performed at various civic functions. They are also touring elementary schools with a children's play Aladdin. Dobyns-Bennett was also represented at the state tournament with an after-dinner speaker and debate team.

At Gatlinburg-Pittman High School, Mary Montgomery and Violet Price directed the play, Cheaper by the Dozen in December. They also had students in Original Oratory at the State Tournament. They had students participate in an Optimist Speech Contest.

Harding Academy of Memphis has both a Readers Theatre group and a One-Act Play in state competition. Both of these categories were 1st place honors for Harding Academy in District THSSDL competition. Their dramatic production of the year was 12 Angry Men. Directors at Harding are Glenda Cox in Speech and Deb Holloway in Theatre, and Bill Pullen in Forensics.

Tullahoma High School has been quite successful this year. They have participated in several tournaments across the state and have won honors at all tournaments. They were well represented at the State Tournament and won fourth in Interpretation of Humorous Literature, 3rd in One-Act Play division with the play Vanities, and 1st in Solo Acting; Jessi Rausche won this award for the 2nd year. Tullahoma senior class produced the play Arsenic and Old Lace. Their spring production Finian's Rainbow will be held May 3, 4, and 5.

-- Colleges and Universities --

Middle Tennessee State University

Appointments: Laura Livingston, Assistant Director of Forensics.

Forensics Activities: MTSU debaters have traveled to twelve tournaments this year, including tournaments in Florida, Georgia,

Alabama, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Kansas. Thirteen trophies have been won by MTSU debaters this year, in tournaments at Auburn University, Samford University, the University of Georgia, the University of Florida, and the Tennessee Inter-collegiate Forensics Tournament.

Ralph Hillman was elected Secretary of the Speech Education Interest Group of the Southern Speech Communication Association at the annual convention in Biloxi, Mississippi April 13, 1979, for a three year term.

1978-79 TSCA MEMBERSHIP LIST

Members are listed alphabetically followed by their business institution, mailing address, and indicated TSCA interest groups.

Helen B. Adams; Tennessee State University; TSU Centennial Blvd., Nashville, TN 37209. Theatre, Rhetoric & Public Address.

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