

THE EFFECTS OF DOGMATISM ON MESSAGE FORMULATION

Craig Allen Smith

Over a span of four decades many psychologists have explored the nature of the "authoritarian personality."<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps the most lucid description of the general "Authoritarian Character Structure" is contained in a 1943 article by Abraham Maslow, who describes eight characteristics:

1. A Tendency to Hierarchy -- "regard most or all human beings as challenging rivals who are either superior (and therefore to be feared, resented, bootlicked and admired); or inferior (and therefore to be scorned, humiliated, and dominated). People are ranked on a vertical scale as if they were on a ladder, and they are divided into those above and below."
2. A Tendency to Generalize Superiority-Inferiority Relationships
3. A Drive for Power
4. Hostility, Hatred and Prejudice
5. A Unitary Scale of Values -- other scales become threats.
6. A Tendency to Identify Kindness with Weakness
7. Sadistic-Masochistic Tendencies -- when dominant the authoritarian is sadistic, when submissive it is masochistic.
8. Virtually Impossible to Satisfy any of these needs.
9. Guilt Feelings and Conflicts<sup>2</sup>

In 1950, T. W. Adorno et al introduced the California F Scale to measure authoritarianism. But since their primary purpose was to explore the bases of anti-semitism and facism, rather than pure authoritarianism, the F Scale exhibits a strong liberal bias.<sup>3</sup>

To correct for this and other methodological weaknesses in the F Scale, Milton Rokeach devised the Dogmatism (D) Scale to tap general or topic-free authoritarianism. He derived his theory from the premise that authoritarianism is related to the structure of one's belief/disbelief systems and is therefore independent of content.<sup>4</sup>

The research on Dogmatism to date has been voluminous. In their review of the literature nearly ten years ago, Vacchiano, Strauss, and Hochmann wrote that:

All in all, if one can evaluate concepts by the amount and nature of research they stimulate, dogmatism, in a short period of time, has proven a potent formulation. It has provided a common denominator for such diverse areas as classroom teaching and personality development, interpersonal behavior and the employment of defense mechanisms.<sup>5</sup>

But what do we know about the relationship between Dogmatism and human communication?

Gerald Miller and others have studied the effects of Dogmatism on message reception fairly extensively. But to date we know little about the effects of Dogmatism on verbal behavior. This paper will attempt to synthesize our knowledge of Dogmatism as an encoding variable.

## II

First, let us examine the literature to ascertain the relationships between Dogmatism and some potentially encoder-related variables.

Vacchiano, Strauss, and Schiffman administered the D Scale and 58 diverse personality instruments to 82 college

students and concluded that high dogmatic individuals are characterized by a need for support and encouragement, an intolerance for the feelings and motives of others, a general reluctance to change and preference for the familiar despite inconsistencies, a lack of self-esteem and ego strength and a generally maladjusted personality.<sup>6</sup> When Bernhardsen and Fisher replicated the study, however, they found a number of spurious relationships. Since they were unable to tell precisely which were spurious, they recommend that we accept the Vacchiano results with caution.<sup>7</sup>

In terms of behavioral predispositions, we have evidence that Dogmatism is positively correlated with a rejection of minorities and change-related groups,<sup>8</sup> learning difficulties,<sup>9</sup> intolerance for ambiguity,<sup>10</sup> rapid decision-making after a limited information search,<sup>11</sup> and a tendency to avoid risky situations.<sup>12</sup>

We also have some evidence that Dogmatism is negatively correlated with creativity<sup>13</sup> and with scores on the Verbal College Qualification Test<sup>14</sup> (although Dogmatism tends to decrease with college education).<sup>15</sup>

There is some evidence that Dogmatism is a curvilinear predictor of the ability to differentiate between source and message.<sup>16</sup>

Ehrlich and Lee echo Maslow when they conclude that high Dogmatics tend to:

hold negative beliefs about self and others, hold contradictory self-beliefs, engage in self-proselytization, seek status and power, report a sense of martyrdom, and display moral self-righteousness.<sup>17</sup>

Much research has explored the relationships between the D Scale, the F Scale, and conservatism. One group of studies suggests that the D Scale, like the F Scale before it, is not topic-free--that conservatives score higher than liberals.<sup>18</sup> A second school holds that the D Scale works as a measure of topic-free authoritarianism.<sup>19</sup> This group implies that conservatives might just be somewhat more authoritarian than liberals. A third group of studies has compared the constructs using factor analysis and found that F and D are related but discriminable entities.<sup>20</sup> Their data suggest that D and F are valid constructs when properly used, which may routinely correlate with conservatism.

But, significantly, none of this research has directly investigated the influence of D on message formulation.

### III

In 1964, Haiman and Duns published the results of four experiments and concluded that:

Results in all studies indicated that it was possible, with a modest but statistically significant degree of assurance, for observers to predict subjects' scores on dogmatism scales from their communicative behavior.<sup>21</sup>

Although one could argue that their results were more modest than significant, their feat is all the more intriguing because they did not identify the characteristics which signalled the differences between high and low Dogmatic sources. Essentially, they reported that a significant number of raters guessed correctly. Unfortunately, however, no one pursued this research.

But before we can hypothesize and substantiate relationships, we need to explore. There has been a healthy trend in recent years toward an appreciation of the "pre-scientific"<sup>22</sup> or hypothesis-generating functions of rhetorical criticism and content analysis.<sup>23</sup> Scheidel has suggested, for example, that we need different standards for evidence during different phases of inquiry:

The perspective in the first phase is expansive, searching, scanning. The findings from multiple complimentary approaches are sought. Standards for evidence are relatively relaxed. Tacit knowledge and intuition are admissible for hypothesis development. More speech communication research of this type is needed.<sup>24</sup>

To this end I conducted three exploratory studies of the relationship between Dogmatism and encoding behavior. Collectively, they lead us toward some interesting hypothesis for more tightly controlled experimental research.

#### Dogmatism and Written Messages<sup>25</sup>

A total of 224 students in the introductory communication course at Purdue University (Fall, 1975) completed the Rokeach D and California F Scales. Later in the semester each was assigned a two-page persuasive message, aimed at converting a hostile audience to a position about which the source felt more strongly than any other.<sup>26</sup>

The messages were subjected to content analytical procedures using the thematic variables of topic<sup>27</sup> and stance,<sup>28</sup> two logical analyses derived from the writings of Stephen Toulmin<sup>29</sup> and Carroll Arnold,<sup>30</sup> and stylistic analysis based

upon average sentence length, "monolithic terms,"<sup>31</sup> and a typology of statements which had proved useful when investigating the "politically paranoid" discourse of the John Birch Society.<sup>32</sup>

The data (N=148) suggested four significant differences. First, both high and low groups used significantly more qualifiers per claim than did the moderates. Although such apparent curvilinearity is not novel, it is difficult to explain with respect to Rokeach's theory. Perhaps most reasonable is the contention that high D's qualify because they are somewhat defensive, while low D's qualify because they perceive finer shades of meaning.

Second, low D's sought significantly more factual judgments than did either medium or high D's. This could indicate that low D's are less evaluative than high D's.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, two stylistic variables -- assertions and questions -- were inversely related to dogmatism. The assertion rate suggests that low D's tend to rely on the inherent validity of their assertions, while increasing D leads them to more frequently ask and answer the question, "according to whom?"; this is consistent with John Kline's description of "people-oriented" and "content-oriented" individuals,<sup>34</sup> and is not inconsistent with his observation that high D's tend to more heavily document their arguments.<sup>35</sup>

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The increase in questions could be related either to the high D's low self-esteem (and subsequent fear that his audience would provide the "wrong" answer to his question)

or to his desire to provide rather than seek information when in a position of dominance over his audience.

Perhaps most significant, these four sets of differences disappeared when the same analyses were partitioned according to scores on the California F Scale, despite a D-F correlation of .71 (significant beyond .001). This suggests that the discriminable differences between D and F include something strongly related to encoding behavior.

But as interesting as these results were, they failed to predict either relative or specific scores with statistically acceptable accuracy.

#### Dogmatism and Oral Messages<sup>36</sup>

Since a sizeable body of literature has described differences between oral and written messages,<sup>37</sup> and since Haiman and Duns reported differential ratings of oral, transcribed, written and interactive messages,<sup>38</sup> the first study was replicated to determine the effects of D and F on oral messages.

A total of 148 students in the introductory public speaking class at Memphis State University (Spring, 1977) were administered the F and D Scales. Later in the semester their instructors assigned them a five-minute speech to convert a hostile audience on the subject about which the speaker felt most strongly. The speeches were recorded (ostensibly to familiarize the students with microphone speaking) and subjected to content analytic procedures.<sup>39</sup>



Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the "written" study, none of the analyses attained significance at the .05 level. The discriminate analyses suggest two functions with F probabilities of .88 and .89, while the results of all the regressions attain an  $r^2$  value of only .19.<sup>40</sup> Clearly, D and the encoding behavior of this sample (with respect to the variables tested) were unrelated. Nor were there any statistically significant differences related to the California F Scale. Two possible explanations should be considered.

First, it is entirely possible that the difference between oral and written styles are such that they overcome the differences attributable to Dogmatism. Perhaps the effects of Dogmatism are brought forth only when an individual searches carefully for the "best" way to phrase a message. In such a case, Dogmatism would influence the writer's judgments as to caution, support and authority. For the speaker presenting a thematically prepared but extemporaneously phrased message, however, this would be less important than his primary goal of fluency. But this assumes that the subjects in the written study took great pains (or at least minimal discomfort) to forge their persuasive messages. This is an assumption that the author is somewhat reluctant to make, since most of the messages were scrawled in ink on notebook paper in a generally careless fashion. Nevertheless, the act of composing on paper involves an extra step which may be important in this regard.

A second possible explanation is that the differences in communicative behavior between the rural midwesterners from Purdue and the urban southerners from Memphis State were more important than either measure of authoritarianism. In either case, the results suggest that some intervening variable is more important to encoding behavior than dogmatism.

#### IV

The research to date enables us to formulate some general hypotheses for future research. We will divide them into sections for organizational purposes, although many of them are interconnected.<sup>41</sup>

A. Since much of the research suggests that D and F are related but discriminable entities, we may hypothesize that:

1. D is related to encoding behavior while F is not;
2. The influence of D on encoding behavior is secondary to other influences;
3. The effects of D on encoding behavior are not consistently positive, negative, or curvilinear;
4. High, medium and low D's tend to adopt similar verbal behaviors, presumably for different reasons;
5. High and low D's will use significantly more qualifiers per claim than moderates, but for different reasons.

B. Since D is related to a desire to avoid risk, low self-esteem and low creativity, we may hypothesize that:

6. When challenged, high D's should tend to reiterate or abandon arguments, while low D's should tend to justify and explain their argument;
7. High D's should prefer friendly to hostile audience to a greater degree than low D's;

8. Given the same audience, high D's should perceive it as generally hostile, low D's as generally uncommitted;
  9. Given the opportunity, low D's should be more likely to attempt conversion;
  10. Dogmatism should be inversely related to the ability to formulate new arguments;
  11. Presented with an opportunity to advance a novel argument (e.g., debate), low D's should use it more frequently than high D's;
  12. High D's should be better able to reproduce arguments for multiple audiences;
  13. High D's should be more likely to reiterate arguments, phrases and evidence;
  14. Low D's should ask more questions than high D's;
  15. High D's will answer more of the questions they ask, unless it is a perceived friendly audience;
  16. Low D's will not answer the questions they ask, unless it is a perceived hostile audience.
- C. Since D is related to a tendency to hierarchy, and a tendency to generalize superiority-inferiority relationships, we may hypothesize that:
17. High D's should employ proportionately more supporting materials than low D's;
  18. High D's should tend to be generally "people oriented," low D's more "content oriented" in their selection of evidence;
  19. High D's should be more likely to expect audience deference to his sources;
  20. When presented as an authority on his subject, high D's should tend to forego support and expect audience deference while low D's behavior should undergo little change;
  21. High D's should be less likely to critique or evaluate their sources;

22. When faced with an ambiguous situation, low D's will describe it, while high D's will evaluate it.

D. Since D is related to the rejection of minorities and change, we may hypothesize that:

23. High D's should adopt anti-minority positions more frequently than low D's;

24. Of those expressing anti-minority views the majority should be high D's:

25. When a radical change is proposed, high D's should attempt to preserve the status quo despite possible flaws, medium D's should prefer modification of the status quo to alleviate the problem, and low D's should consider the proposal on its own merit.

E. Since D is negatively correlated with cognitive complexity and the ability to search for new information, we may hypothesize that:

26. High D's should have the most difficulty with semantic arguments;

27. Dogmatism should be negatively correlated with message length;

28. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with message oversimplification;

29. Dogmatism should be negatively correlated with message complication;

30. High D's should perform better than low D's on extemporaneous communication assignments;

31. Low D's should perform better than high D's on prepared speech assignments;

32. In a class involving equal weighting of prepared and extemporaneous assignments, medium D's should perform the best;

33. High D's should be most likely to defend their remarks, even when they are not overtly challenged.

F. Because D is related to moral self-righteousness, we may hypothesize that:

34. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with ideological subjects and arguments;

35. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with the vehemence of delivery;
36. Dogmatism will therefore consistently be confused by raters with:
  - a. vehemence
  - b. ego-involvement
  - c. conservatism
  - d. disagreement with the rater
  - e. stubbornness
  - f. conviction.

#### V.

The kind of research reported here is not intended to be conclusive. In the 23 years since Rokeach introduced the D Scale we have turned some stones. We have just begun to see that we have only looked at part of the process -- message reception.

The hypotheses presented here are suggestive. They are drawn from existing research and are intended to be tested using the rigorous procedures that Scheidel posits for "phase three" research. But as he warns, we must not be overly concerned with testing these or any other hypotheses. The important concern is that we test the theory as it is reflected in these hypotheses.

NOTES

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<sup>1</sup>The best known works are Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1965), Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), and Milton Rokeach, The Open-and Closed-Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

<sup>2</sup>Abraham H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," Journal of Social Psychology, 18 (November, 1943), 401-411.

<sup>3</sup>It is important to recall that this Fascist tendency was precisely the variable which Adorno et al hoped to measure. Unfortunately, the title of their book led many to misunderstand the F Scale's purpose. For a more thorough treatment of the F Scale and its weaknesses see Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1945).

<sup>4</sup>Rokeach introduced the D Scale in "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," Psychological Monographs, 70 (1965) No. 18 (whole no. 425): The Open-and Closed-Mind contains his original theory and scale as well as subsequent research.

<sup>5</sup>Ralph B. Vacchiano, Paul S. Strauss, and Leonard Hochman, "The Open-and Closed-Mind: A Review of Dogmatism," Psychological Bulletin, 71 (1968), 270.

<sup>6</sup>Ralph B. Vacchiano, Paul R. Strauss, and David C. Schiffman, "Personality Correlates of Dogmatism," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 32 (1968), 83-85.

<sup>7</sup>Clemens S. Bernhardson and Ronald J. Fisher, "Personality Correlates of Dogmatism: Methodological Problems," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 34 (1970), 449.

<sup>8</sup>Donald Kirtley and Richard Harkless, "Some Personality and Attitudinal Correlates of Dogmatism," Psychological Reports, 24 (1969), 851-854.

<sup>9</sup>Howard J. Ehrlich and Dorothy Lee, "Dogmatism, Learning and Resistance to Change: A Review and a New Paradigm," Psychological Bulletin, 71 (1969), 249-260.

<sup>10</sup>Joseph Zacker, "Authoritarian Avoidance of Ambiguity," Psychological Reports, 33 (December, 1973), 901-902; and Harvey J. Brightman and Thomas F. Urban, "The Influence of the Dogmatic Personality upon Information Processing: A Comparison with a Bayesian Information Processor," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 11 (April, 1974), 226-276.

<sup>11</sup>Ronald M. Taylor and Marvin D. Dunnette, "Influence of Dogmatism, Risk-taking Propensity and Intelligence on Decision-making Strategies for a Sample of Industrial managers," Journal of Applied Psychology, 59 (August, 1974), 420-423.

<sup>12</sup>Timothy G. Plax and Lawrence B. Rosenfeld, "Dogmatism and Decisions Involving Risk," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 41 (Spring, 1976), 266-277.

<sup>13</sup>Lynne Rouff, "Openness, Creativity and Complexity," Psychological Reports, 37 (December, 1975), 1009-1010; and Jon Van Zaig, "An Investigation into 'The Open- and Closed-Mind,'" abstract appears in Dissertation Abstracts International, 31 (September, 1970), 1524.

<sup>14</sup>Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., Joe E. Willis, Frederick Ikard, and John A. Dohme, "Dogmatism, Future Orientation and Perception of Time," Journal of Social Psychology, 73 (1967), 205-209.

<sup>15</sup>Ralph F. Berdie, "College Courses and Changes in Dogmatism," Research in Higher Education, 2 (1974), 133-143.

<sup>16</sup>Gilbert Becker, "Ability to Differentiate Message from Source as a Curvilinear Function of Scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale," Journal of Social Psychology, 72 (1967), 265-273.

<sup>17</sup>Dorothy E. Lee and Howard J. Ehrlich, "Beliefs About Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory," Psychological Reports, 28 (June, 1971), 919-922.

<sup>18</sup> See for example Kirtley and Harkless (1969); Frank Costin, "Dogmatism and Conservatism: An Empirical Follow-up of Rokeach's Findings," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 31 (Winter, 1971), 1007-1010; Robert C. Thompson and Jerry B. Michel, "Measuring Authoritarianism: A Comparison of the F and D Scales," Journal of Personality, 40 (June, 1972), 180-190; and James C. McCroskey and Michael Burgoon, "Establishing Predictors of Latitude of Acceptance-Rejection and Attitudinal Intensity: A Comparison of Assumptions of Social Judgment and Authoritarian Personality Theories," Speech Monographs, 41 (November, 1974), 421-426.

<sup>19</sup> See for example Herbert W. Simons, "Dogmatism Scales and Leftist Bias," Speech Monographs, 35 (June 1968), 149-153; Herbert W. Simons and Nancy Neff Berkowitz, "Rokeach's Dogmatism and Leftist Bias," Speech Monographs, 36 (November, 1969), 459-463; David J. Hanson, "Dogmatism Among Authoritarians of the Right and the Left," Psychological Studies, 14 (January, 1969), 12-21; David J. Hanson, "Dogmatism and Political Ideology," Journal of Human Relations, 18 (1970), 995-1002; David J. Hanson, "Dogmatism and Authoritarianism," Journal of Social Psychology, 76 (1968), 89-95; David J. Hanson, "Validity Test of the Dogmatism Scale," Psychological Reports, 26 (1970), 558-586; and David V. Stimpson and JoAnne D'Alo, "Dogmatism, Attitude Extremity, and Attitude Intensity as Determinants of Perceptual Displacement," Journal of Psychology, 86 (January, 1974), 87-91.

<sup>20</sup> Fred N. Kerlinger and Milton Rokeach, "The Factorial Nature of the F and D Scales," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (1966), 391-399 (in which the authors suggest that F factors are "authoritarian aggression," "submission to in-group authority," and "impulse control" and that D factors are "belief in one cause," "belief in one truth," "isolation-alienation," "self-proselytization," and an "unnamed factor"), and Peter B. Warr, R. E. Lee, and K. G. Joereskoeg, "A Note on the Factorial Nature of the F and D Scales," British Journal of Psychology, (1969), 119-123 (in which the authors suggested two common factors: "dogmatic opinionation" and "pragmatism," F factors "general authoritarianism," "personal morality," "nationalism," "institutional toughmindedness," and "personal toughmindedness," and one cause, "personal ambition," "virtuous self-denial," and "self-proselytization").

<sup>21</sup> Franklyn S. Hiaman and Donald F. Duns, "Validators of Communicative Behavior of Attitude-Scale Measures of Dogmatism," Journal of Social Psychology, 64 (1964), 296.



<sup>22</sup>John Waite Bowers, "The Pre-Scientific Function of Rhetorical Criticism," in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism (ed.) by Thomas Nilsen, (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 126-143.

<sup>23</sup>See especially Thomas M. Scheidel, "Evidence Varies with Phases of Inquiry," Western Speech Journal, 41 (Winter, 1977), 20-31; and Roderick P. Hart, "Theory-Building and Rhetorical Criticism: An Informal Statement of Opinion," Central State Speech Journal, 27 (Spring, 1976), 70-77.

<sup>24</sup>Scheidel, p. 30.

<sup>25</sup>Craig Allen Smith, "Communicative Characteristics of Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in Written Messages," The Central States Speech Journal, 29 (Winter, 1978), 293-303.

<sup>26</sup>Students were given no indication that these two tasks were related, nor was there any indication that they perceived a connection. Introductory classes were used to minimize the effects of college education on Dogmatism which were described by Berdie (1974). The conversion, hostility, important-topic paradigm was designed to elicit maximum ego-involvement.

<sup>27</sup>Topic categories were "Personal" (matters pertaining to an individual which need not involve society), "Social" (matters pertaining to the good of society at large, or personal matters approached from a normative perspective), "Political" (matters pertaining to the governing of society or the pursuit of power), "Economic" (matters pertaining to the distribution of resources within a society), "Recreational" (matters pertaining to the use of leisure time), "Religious" (matters pertaining to spiritual affairs of one's faith in a Supreme Being), "Educational" (matters pertaining to the institutionalized learning process), and "Scientific" (matters pertaining to research and technology). Although some of the essays could have been classified into multiple categories, each was assigned to that category which, in the coder's opinion, best summarized the composition's primary thrust.

<sup>28</sup>Stance categories were "Defend" (defend or protect the status quo), "Modify" (accept the status quo generally, but seek a specific change within it), "Destroy" (indict the status quo as cause of significant problems and argue for its repeal or revolution), and "Propose" (advocate a new course of action not embodied in the status quo. This may, in some cases, include destruction of the status quo).

<sup>29</sup>Coders determined whether each phase or statement functioned rhetorically as a "Claim" ("the conclusion whose merits we are seeking to establish"), "Data" ("the facts we

appeal to as a foundation for the claim"), "Warrant" ("rules, principles, inferences...which can act as bridges, and authorise the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us"), "Qualifier" ("indicating the strength conferred by the warrant on this step"), "Rebuttal" ("indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside"), or "Backing" ("standing behind our warrants...will normally be other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor currency"). A series of ratios were computed for each individual (e.g., qualifiers per claim, data per claim, backing per warrant, etc.) to permit comparison of logical styles of different speakers. For a more complete explanation of Toulmin's ideas see Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) especially pp. 94-145. For other examples of Toulminian criticism see Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46 (February, 1960), 44-53; and Roderick P. Hart, "On Applying Toulmin: The Analysis of Practical Discourse," in Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism (ed.) by Gerald P. Mohrman, Charles J. Stewart and Donovan J. Ochs (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1973), pp. 75-95.

<sup>30</sup>Arnold describes four types of judgments typically sought by communicators: "Factual" ("judgments accepting or rejecting the alleged existence, form, capacities, etc, or something"), "Optative" ("evaluative judgments endorsing or rejecting something on the basis of general personal or social preferences"), "Adjudicative" ("judgments on the conformity that exists or is lacking between things or events and formally agreed upon codes or standards"), and judgments "predictive of Desirability" ("evaluative judgments endorsing things on the basis of their desirability, feasibility, potency, and so forth for the future"). For a more complete discussion see Carroll C. Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), p. 70. These judgmental analysis were used to determine the extend to which personality type would affect one's perception of the rhetorical task.

<sup>31</sup>"Monolithic terms" are words or phrases which convey an image of individuals or disparate things thinking or working in a concerted manner.

<sup>32</sup>Craig Allen Smith, "The Hofstadter Hypothesis Revisited: The Nature of Evidence in Politically 'Paranoid' Discourse," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42 (Spring, 1977), 279-280.

<sup>33</sup>Although one might infer that low D's therefore used more facts in support of their claims (than high D's), the data-to-claim ratio did not support this conclusion.

<sup>34</sup> John A. Kline, "A Q-Analysis of Encoding Behavior in The Selection of Evidence," Speech Monographs, 38 (June, 1971), 190-197.

<sup>35</sup> John A. Kline, "Dogmatism of the Speaker and Selection of Evidence," Speech Monographs, 38 (November, 1971), 354-355. For related material see Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965) in which the author cites the tendency to document as a characteristic of the "paranoid style;" and Paul I. Rosenthal, "Specificity, Verifiability and Message Credibility," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (December, 1971), 393-401 for a discussion of the credibility of documentation.

<sup>36</sup> Craig Allen Smith, "SPECIAL REPORT: Communicative Characteristics of Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in Oral Messages," The Central States Speech Journal, 29 (Winter, 1978), 304-307.

<sup>37</sup> See for example James W. Gibson, Charles R. Gruner, Robert J. Kibler, and Francis J. Kelly, "A Quantitative Examination of Differences and Similarities in Written and Spoken Messages," Speech Monographs, 33 (November, 1966), 444-451; Charles R. Gruner, Robert J. Kibler, and James W. Gibson, "A Quantitative Analysis of Selected Characteristics of Oral and Written Vocabularies," Journal of Communication, 17 (June, 1967), 152-158; Joseph DeVito, "Psychogrammatical Factors in Oral and Written Discourse by Skilled Communicators," Speech Monographs, 33 (March, 1966), 73-76; and Joseph DeVito, "A Linguistic Analysis of Spoken and Written Language," Central States Speech Journal, 18 (May, 1967), 81-85.

<sup>38</sup> In Experiment #1 Haiman and Duns reported that raters accurately predicted high D's in 83% of the cases from oral messages and only 63% when those same messages were transcribed. Conversely, the same raters accurately predicted low D in only 33% of the cases, and increased their accuracy to 67% when rating the transcriptions. Thus the transcriptions seem most reliable. In Experiment #2, ratings (by those familiar with the construct) of written messages were accurate predictions of high D in 88% of the cases, while the low D accuracy was only 36%.

<sup>39</sup> Although it was considerably more difficult to analyze recordings than transcriptions, the author felt it important to preserve the orality of the messages. The overall inter-coder reliability coefficient for both studies was .75. Due to an unusual technical malfunction, the extremely important Toulminian analyses were invalid. More exploratory research using the Toulminian ratios is needed in light of the significant qualifier-to-claim ratio differences in the "written" study.

40 This is consistent with Haiman and Dun's low accuracy of low D prediction, but very surprising in light of their 88% high D oral prediction. It suggests that delivery may account for a large part of the variance.

41 These hypotheses are suggestive, not exhaustive. I do not intend to imply that any or all of them can be easily proven, or that there is no contrary or conflicting evidence. I am suggesting that we have sufficient confidence in them to warrant the rigors of "Phase three" research.